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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Plaintiffs' Claims 
1. Should this Court uphold the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, 
where dismissal was based on Plaintiffs' sworn testimony from the 
temporary injunction hearing that they had not tendered performance 
under the real estate purchase contract, but instead began 
negotiating a lease option that was never accepted by nor signed by 
Defendants? 
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for 
summary judgment is a legal one and will be reviewed for 
correctness." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 
P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995). 
2. Should this Court uphold the trial court's denial of 
specific performance of the real estate purchase contract, which 
Plaintiffs abandoned in favor of negotiating a lease option, where 
Plaintiffs, in their complaint, asked for enforcement of the 
contract only under a theory of fraud, which theory they do not 
brief on appeal, instead claiming on appeal a breach by Defendants 
and an excused tender by Plaintiffs? 
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A trial court's decision on whether to require specific 
performance is an equitable one, reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
while "[a] trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for 
summary judgment is a legal one and will be reviewed for 
correctness." Silver Fork Pipeline Corp./ 913 P.2d at 733. 
3. Should this Court uphold the trial court's rejection of 
Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim where Plaintiffs, after 
failing to obtain financing to close the REPC, prepared a written 
proposed lease option which they submitted to Defendants and which 
Defendants did not accept, sign or return to Plaintiffs and where 
Defendants did not indicate that they would not require a written, 
signed agreement that complied with the statute of frauds? 
"Promissory estoppel is an equitable claim . . . ." Andreason 
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
As a trial court's determination thereon is an equitable one, it is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, Carr, 781 P. 2d at 1294, while 
"[a] trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary 
judgment is a legal one and will be reviewed for correctness." 
Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d at 733. 
4. Should this Court uphold the trial court's denial of 
Plaintiffs' motion to amend to add a breach of contract claim, 
where that claim was not raised in Plaintiffs' amended complaints 
but rather belatedly raised by motion after the entry of the 
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summary judgment, and where, in any case, Plaintiffs failed to 
perform their obligations under the real estate purchase contract? 
"[This Court] overturn[s] a trial court's denial of a motion 
to amend a complaint only when . . . [the Court] find[s] an abuse 
of discretion." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 739 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). Meanwhile, "[i]f a contract is unambiguous, 
interpretation of the contract is a question of law, 
review[ed]. . . under a correctness standard." Craig Food Indus., 
Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
5. Should this Court uphold the trial court's rejection of 
Plaintiffs' motion to amend its complaint to add a claim for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, where that claim 
was not raised in Plaintiffs' amended complaints but raised only 
after the entry of the summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' 
complaint and where the alleged wrongful actions of Defendants 
occurred only after the REPC had been set aside and the date for 
closing had passed? 
"[This Court] overturn[s] a trial court's denial of a motion 
to amend a complaint only when . . . [the Court] find[s] an abuse 
of discretion." Kelly, 87 P.3d at 739. 
6. Should this Court uphold the trial court's decision not 
to permit Plaintiffs to amend their complaint pursuant to Rule 
15(b), where Plaintiffs' complaint had already been dismissed by 
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summary judgment and where Plaintiffs had already filed two amended 
complaints? 
"[This Court] overturn[s] a trial court's denial of a motion 
to amend a complaint only when . . . [the Court] find[s] an abuse 
of discretion." Kellv, 87 P.3d at 739. 
7. Should this Court reject Plaintiffs' entreaty to find 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5 unconstitutional on due process grounds 
where the due process argument was limited, before the trial court, 
to the right to appeal and other due process issues are raised for 
the first time on appeal, where the statute affords parties an 
opportunity to be heard before any ruling on a motion brought 
pursuant thereto and where the losing party may apply for a stay 
pending appeal? 
"Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law . 
review[ed] for correctness.'7 Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1185 
(Utah 2004). 
8. Should this Court uphold the trial court's ruling denying 
Plaintiffs' request for reimbursement of attorney fees where 
Plaintiffs did not prevail at the trial court? 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, 
. . . review[ed] for correctness." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 
P.3d 1119, 1125 (Utah 2002). 
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Defendants' Cross-Appeal 
9. Did the trial court err when it determined that 
Plaintiffs' lis pendens was not a wrongful lien on Defendants' 
property, where Plaintiffs sought to enforce a lease option that 
was not accepted nor signed by Defendants, where Plaintiffs sought 
to enforce a real estate purchase contract that, following a 
temporary injunction hearing, the trial court found unenforceable 
due to Plaintiffs' failure to tender their performance and where 
Defendants notified Plaintiffs to remove the lien based on the 
ruling of the trial court following the injunction hearing? 
"[I]ssues of law . . . [are] reviewfed] for correctness." 
State v. Gonzales, 127 P.3d 1252, 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
10. Did the trial court err by not awarding Defendants their 
attorney fees where the contract provided that the prevailing party 
should recoup attorney fees incurred in an action to enforce the 
contract and where Defendants were required to defend against 
Plaintiffs' efforts to enforce the contract? 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, 
. . . review[ed] for correctness." R.T. Nielson Co., 40 P.3d at 
1125. 
11. Should Defendants recover the attorney fees incurred on 
appeal where the contract provides for the prevailing party to 
recover fees? 
5 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, 
. . . review [ed] for correctness.'' R.T. Nielson Co. , 40 P. 3d at 
1125. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD AS TO ISSUE PRESERVATION 
Defendants raised the issues of wrongful lien and/or attorney 
fees in their answer and counterclaim, R. 64-73, their Motion to 
Award Fees and Costs with its companion memorandum, R. 522-36, 
their subsequent reply memorandum, R. 568-81, and their memorandum 
in opposition to Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. R. 421-66. 
The trial court awarded fees for the injunction hearing, based on 
statute, but denied the request for fees based on the REPC. R. 729. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code § 25-5-3 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than 
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest 
in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note 
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. See Addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2. See Appellants' Addendum 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5. See Appellants' Addendum 2. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). See Appellants' Addendum 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, as buyers, and Defendants, as sellers, executed a 
real estate purchase contract (REPC) in August of 2004 with a 
closing date of October 24, 2004. In September 2004, Plaintiffs 
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informed Defendants that they could not obtain financing. The 
parties, at the suggestion of Plaintiffs, then started to negotiate 
the terms of a lease with option to purchase (the Proposed Lease) . 
The parties did not come to an agreement on the terms of the 
Proposed Lease and, in late October, Defendants received another 
offer for the property and sold the property to a third party. 
Plaintiffs then filed a complaint for specific performance. After 
Plaintiffs testified that they had not performed under the REPC, 
the complaint was amended to seek enforcement of the Proposed Lease 
under the theories of fraud, waiver and promissory estoppel, and 
enforcement of the REPC under a fraud theory, which Plaintiffs did 
not brief on appeal. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
The case has a lengthy procedural history due primarily to the 
numerous amendments and motions filed by Plaintiffs in an effort to 
find a claim on which they might prevail. The proceedings are as 
follows: 
1. The original complaint was filed in November 2004. R. 5. 
2. A hearing on Plaintiffs' request for an injunction was 
held on November 29, 2004. At that hearing, Plaintiffs admitted 
that they encountered difficulty obtaining financing to purchase 
the property, that they then began negotiating a lease option and 
that they never tendered the purchase price. See Addendum B, 
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excerpts from temporary injunction hearing. The trial court denied 
Plaintiffs' request for an injunction. R. 47. 
3. On January 20, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended 
Complaint changing their theories and requesting enforcement of the 
Proposed Lease under the theories of fraud, waiver and promissory 
estoppel, and enforcement of the REPC under a fraud theory. R. 57. 
4. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaimed for 
reimbursement of legal fees and costs, as well as damages under the 
wrongful lien statute and the terms of the REPC. R. 64. 
5. On August 26, 2005, Defendants filed their motion for 
summary judgment. R. 117. 
6. On November 1, 2005, Plaintiffs' filed a responsive 
memorandum and cross-motion for summary judgment. R. 191. 
7. Plaintiffs also filed a motion to amend their complaint 
for the second time, pleading the same causes of action but 
attempting to plead fraud with more particularity. R. 368. 
8. Oral argument on the motions was held on December 19, 
2005. R. 498. 
9. On January 11, 2006, the court issued its Ruling and 
Order, granting Defendants' summary judgment motion, dismissing 
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint and denying Plaintiffs' cross-
motion for summary judgment. R. 508, Addendum C. 
10. Defendants then filed their Motion to Award Costs and 
Fees seeking the relief requested in their counterclaim. R. 534. 
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11. On January 30, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion to 
reconsider and attempted therein to assert new claims. R. 553. 
12. On March 14, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion to conform 
the complaint to the evidence with a proposed Third Amended 
Complaint which asserted new claims. R. 643. 
13. On March 29, 2006, the trial court issued its Ruling and 
Order denying Plaintiffs' motions to reconsider and granting 
Defendants' motion for fees only as it related to the injunction 
hearing. R. 661, Addendum D. 
14. On April 10, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their Notice of 
Appeal. Defendants responded with a Notice of Cross-Appeal, filed 
on April 25, 2006. Defendants also filed a motion to release the 
lis pendens on that same day. R. 702. 
15. On April 26, 2006, the trial court signed its order 
dismissing Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, denying 
Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, dismissing Defendants' wrongful 
lien claim, and awarding Defendants the fees incurred at the 
injunction hearing. R. 729, Addendum E. 
16. On May 10, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Stay 
of the Execution of the Court's Orders and for Approval of the 
Plaintiffs' Supersedeas Bond. R. 748. 
17. On May 15, 2006, the trial court issued its Ruling, 
denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Conform the Complaint to the 
Evidence. The trial court followed this ruling with two rulings on 
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June 21, 2006, one staying execution of its orders contingent upon 
a bond being given by Plaintiffs, and the other rejecting 
Plaintiffs' opposition to the fees awarded for the temporary 
injunction hearing. R. 779, Addendum F. 
18. On August 16, 2006, the trial court issued a Ruling and 
Order granting the release of the lis pendens, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-40-2.5. R. 838, Addendum G. 
19. Plaintiffs, on August 23, 2006, moved for a stay of this 
order and submitted a proposed bond with the trial court and with 
this Court. This Court issued its order stating that the issue must 
first be decided by the trial court and citing authority that 
Plaintiffs might need to bring a separate appeal on Defendants' 
motion, as it could be deemed an enforcement action. R. 846. 
20. On November 21, 2006, the trial court issued its last 
ruling denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend their appeal, and 
granting their motion to stay execution of the court's order based 
upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5. R. 876, Addendum H. 
Statement of the Facts 
This statement of the facts, as that found in Defendants' 
summary judgment memorandum, is based primarily on the sworn 
testimony of Plaintiffs at the injunction hearing on November 29, 
2004, excerpts of which are attached as Addendum B, and the 
transcript of which is listed at page 880 in the record. After that 
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date, Plaintiffs' facts changed and expanded in an effort to defeat 
summary judgment. 
While "searching the internet," Plaintiff Ty Eldridge (Ty) 
learned of Defendants' intent to sell 280 acres in Duchesne County, 
Utah. R. 880:18:16-23. Sometime in August, 2004, Ty contacted 
Defendant James Farnsworth (James) about the property. R. 880:19:2-
5. On August 24, 2004, James executed the REPC. J. Farnsworth Dep. 
at 30:1-4, R. 121-79 (Exhibit B therein). Three days later, Ty and 
his wife, Marina Eldridge (Marina), signed the REPC. See REPC, 
Addendum I. 
The REPC designated the purchase price as $339,000. REPC f 
2.1. The REPC further provided that October 24, 2004 would be the 
settlement deadline, REPC 1 24(d), and that "[t]h[e] Contract 
[could] not be changed except by written agreement of the parties." 
REPC 5 14. Plaintiffs submitted a check for the earnest money 
deposit to Basin Land Title, the closing agent, R. 880:22:20-24, 
and applied for financing from Washington Mutual. R. 880:23:22-23. 
Washington Mutual informed Plaintiffs that the bank "wouldn't 
loan on a working farm." R. 880:24:21-24. Hence, Plaintiffs, on 
September 9, 2004, prior to the time seller disclosures were due, 
REPC f 24, contacted James to tell him of the difficulties with 
Washington Mutual. Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' 1st Disc. Req. at 3, R. 
121-79 (Exhibit D therein). 
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Plaintiffs then contacted other lenders. Those lenders, 
however, "wanted [Plaintiffs] to put up a big proposal on how . . 
[they would] make money farming." R. 880:25:12-15. And, 
Plaintiffs "don't have any experience farming." R. 880:44:20-21. 
" [Ty then] started mentioning to [James] different financing 
options. And the lease option was one of them." R. 880:25:19-20. Ty 
acknowledged that, at first, James exhibited little amenability to 
the lease option, describing James's level of "interest" as "not 
much." R. 880:25:21-25. James, however, did later agree to discuss 
proposed terms of a lease option, R. 880:26:7-9, and a written 
"lease option[f dated October 5, 2004,] that [Ty] prepared . . . 
[was] sen[t] to Jim to look over." R. 880:26:14-15, 21. From that 
point on, the REPC was no longer pursued by the parties. R. 
880:47:20. 
Ty admitted that when Plaintiffs referred to closing, they 
were "really talking about . . . having [the Farnsworths] accept 
th[e] lease agreement." R. 880:47:25-48:4. Indeed, Plaintiffs 
conceded that after "commenc[ing] negotiating the lease option 
agreement, . . . [they] abandoned their efforts to secure 
conventional financing," Second Am. Compl. 1 13, R. 467-473, and, 
at the TRO hearing, Ty was asked, "as of October fifth, you had 
replaced your real estate purchase contract with Exhibit Two, the 
lease[?]" R. 880:47:17-18. He responded: "Yes. That's what I 
thought was happening." R. 880:47:20. 
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After receiving the Proposed Lease, which Plaintiffs prepared 
and sent to him, James "suggest [ed] . . . amendments to the[] 
terms" of it. R. 880:27:14-18. The proposed lease, which remained 
the subject of negotiations until November 1, 2004, was never 
signed by the Farnsworths nor was it returned to Plaintiffs. R. 
880:47:1-5. 
Ty testified, at the temporary injunction hearing, that 
Defendants did not accept the offer for the lease option by 
November 1, 2004. R. 880:48:10-12. Ty further conceded that, 
"[o]ther than the earnest money, [he] never tendered any money" for 
the REPC. R. 880:49:1-13. 
Sometime in the last few days of October, following the 
expiration of the REPC on October 24, 2004, James learned from 
Gerald Wilkerson, a real estate agent, that a Shane Gardner was 
interested in the property and then, a few days later that two 
other potential buyers wished to acquire the property. J. 
Farnsworth Dep. at 86:11-87:11, R. 121-79. On or about November 8, 
2004, Defendants informed Plaintiffs of one of the offers and gave 
Plaintiffs the opportunity to match it. J. Farnsworth Dep. at 
92:15-25; 94:8-14, R. 121-79. Plaintiffs did not match the offer 
and the property was sold to Byron Gibson, on November 12, 2004. J. 
Farnsworth Dep. 104:18-19, R. 121-79. Plaintiffs then sued. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiffs, under oath, testified that they did not 
perform under the REPC, that the terms of the lease option were 
never agreed to and that the lease option was never signed by 
Defendants. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on those undisputed facts. 
2. The trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs' request for 
specific performance, where Plaintiffs admitted that they abandoned 
the REPC, that they did not tender the performance required by the 
REPC, that the lease option terms were not agreed upon and that the 
agreement was never signed by Defendants. 
3. The statute of frauds barred Plaintiffs' attempt to 
enforce a proposed lease agreement that Defendants never accepted 
nor signed. Defendants did not unequivocally indicate that they 
would not invoke the statute of frauds as a defense. Indeed, 
Plaintiffs prepared a written offer for a proposed lease option. 
The parties clearly anticipated a written agreement. 
4. As to Plaintiffs' fourth, fifth and sixth points, the 
trial court properly exercised its discretion when it refused to 
allow Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 15, to amend their complaint a 
third time to include breach of contract, breach of good faith and 
fair dealing and other claims after the court had already dismissed 
the second amended complaint. 
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5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5, which sets forth the 
procedure to obtain the release of a lis pendens, is not 
unconstitutionally violative of due process, as it affords an 
opportunity to be heard and does not bar the granting of a stay 
pending appeal. 
6. Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover their attorney 
fees, as they were not the prevailing party and because they do not 
address on appeal their claim of fraud, which was listed in their 
complaint as the sole basis for enforcement of the REPC (which 
contains the attorney fees provision). 
Defendants' Cross-Appeal 
1. The trial court erred when it ruled that the lis pendens 
placed on Defendants' property was not a wrongful lien where 
Plaintiffs' claims were frivolous. Plaintiffs sought enforcement of 
the Proposed Lease, which was not enforceable under the statute of 
frauds. Further, following the temporary injunction hearing, where 
it became clear Plaintiffs did not tender their performance under 
the REPC and had abandoned the REPC, Plaintiffs nevertheless 
refused to release the lien, despite notice from Defendants of the 
lien's wrongful nature. 
2. Defendants are entitled to reimbursement of their legal 
fees, based on the language of the REPC, incurred both at the trial 
court and on appeal for having to defend against Plaintiffs' 
efforts to enforce the REPC. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BASED ON THE PLAINTIFFS' OWN TESTIMONY. PLAINTIFFS' 
EFFORTS TO CHALLENGE SUMMARY JUDGEMENT BY AMENDING THEIR 
COMPLAINT AND ENLARGING AND CHANGING THEIR TESTIMONY 
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED BY THE COURT. 
The material and essential facts were testified to by 
Plaintiffs at the injunction hearing on November 29, 2004. At that 
hearing, they admitted their difficulty in obtaining financing to 
close the purchase, R. 880:24:21-24,25:12-15,25:19-20, and their 
subsequent abandonment of the REPC when they opted to attempt to 
negotiate a lease with option to purchase. R. 467-473; 880:47:20. 
After a month and a half, the terms of a lease option were never 
agreed to, R. 880:48:10-12, and Defendants sold the property to a 
third party. Based on those undisputed facts, summary judgment was 
appropriate in this case. 
Rule 56(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
" [a] party against whom a claim . . . is asserted may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment 
in his favor as to all or any part thereof." "The primary purpose 
of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the allegations of 
the pleadings, show that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, although an issue may be raised by the pleadings, and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 269 (1960). 
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In this case, Plaintiffs sought enforcement of the REPC. 
However, in testimony at the TRO hearing and in their complaint, as 
outlined above, they conceded that they had difficulty obtaining 
financing, that they never tendered payment, and that they 
abandoned the REPC. Plaintiffs then filed their First and Second 
Amended Complaints calling for enforcement of the Proposed Lease 
under theories of promissory estoppel, fraud and waiver, and 
enforcement of the REPC under their fraud theory. R. 57, 467. 
Defendants, after completion of discovery, filed their summary 
judgment motion, based primarily on Ty' s testimony at the temporary 
injunction hearing. Plaintiffs responded with a barrage of facts 
requesting summary judgment on their Second Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiffs' facts were either attempts to refute the Plaintiffs' 
prior sworn testimony or were not material to the issues and were 
disputed by Defendants. For example, Defendants did not accept any 
offer for the lease option. The parties did not agree on a down 
payment, a purchase price, an interest rate, or a monthly payment, 
among other things. J. Farnsworth Dep. 46:5-16, 48:19-22, R. 421-66 
(Exhibit A therein). James "talk[ed] to [Ty] about contacting an 
escrow company to handle payment under the lease option, if it was 
entered into.'7 J. Farnsworth Dep. at 55:23-56:1, R. 421-66. 
Moreover, James did not express approval of Ty's working on the 
property. In fact, he asked Ty to cease from working on the 
property "after [he] found out [Ty] did it the first time." J. 
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Farnsworth Dep. at 57:14-58:2, R. 421-66. Additionally, Defendants 
did not lie about a realtor. James, with whom Plaintiffs 
negotiated, was not aware of David Farnsworth's communication with 
the realtor about the problem until after October 30, 2004, J. 
Farnsworth Dep. at 84:18-22, R. 421-66, and Plaintiffs concede that 
they verified the listing on October 29, 2004, "confirm[ing] Jim's 
story and ma [king] them feel at ease." Pis.' Facts 1 53, R. 419-20. 
The trial court correctly concluded that, notwithstanding 
Plaintiffs' Gatling gun approach, they had not advanced material 
undisputed facts to avert summary judgment and that the material 
undisputed facts required dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint. 
In short, even when all Plaintiffs' facts were considered, they did 
not avert summary judgment on Plaintiffs' fraud, waiver and 
promissory estoppel claims. 
Plaintiffs then attempted to assert new claims via post-
summary- judgment motions, but the trial court properly rebuffed 
these efforts. Despite Plaintiffs' numerous motions and amendments 
attempting to cloud the facts and issues, this case, at its heart, 
is a simple case. Plaintiffs did not perform their obligations 
under the REPC and abandoned it. The parties then negotiated the 
terms of a Proposed Lease, but did not reach any agreement, and 
Defendants did not sign the Proposed Lease, and, as a consequence, 
it was not enforceable under the statute of frauds. 
II. PLAINTIFFS NEVER TENDERED PERFORMANCE UNDER THE REPC 
AND ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE THEREOF. THE 
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PROPOSED LEASE WAS NEVER AGREED TO AND WAS NOT SIGNED BY 
DEFENDANTS AND, THUS, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE LEASE 
OPTION IS LIKEWISE NOT AVAILABLE. 
Even though Plaintiffs failed to execute their duties under 
the REPC, they asked the trial court to grant specific performance 
of the REPC under a fraud theory (which they did not brief on 
appeal), or the Proposed Lease under theories of fraud, promissory 
estoppel and waiver. The trial court properly denied the requests. 
''Neither party to an agreement ycan be said to be in default 
(and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for 
specific performance) until the other party has tendered his own 
performance/" Kellev v. Leudacia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 
(Utah 1992) (quoting Century 21 All W. Real Estate & Inv., Inc. v. 
Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982)). Hence, in order to recover 
damages or to force specific performance, a party must tender. In 
the instant case, Plaintiffs did not tender their performance. The 
REPC settlement deadline was October 24, 2004. Addendum I. 
Appellants [sic] Brief, at 29, claims there were two other closing 
dates — October 28, 2004 and November 1, 2004. id. at 29, 34. 
These dates are not listed in the Second Amended Complaint, which 
states that "[t]he time set forth in the Contract to close, October 
24, 2004, ha[d] passed,'7 R. 467-473, 1 5. Plaintiffs further assert 
that they tendered their performance via a letter dated November 9, 
2004. Appellants [sic] Br. at 29. There was no closing date other 
than October 24th set forth in the REPC (Addendum I), and there was 
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no closing date for the proposed lease. R. 880:47:25-48:4. 
Nevertheless, even assuming that Plaintiffs' new, and inconsistent, 
closing dates were valid, Plaintiffs did not, by their own 
statement of the facts, "tender" until after the date set for 
closing under either scenario, as November 9th falls after both 
dates. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' November 9th letter did not constitute 
a tender. Plaintiffs invoke Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-1 for the 
proposition that the letter expressing a willingness and ability to 
close the contract was sufficient to meet the tender requirement. 
Appellants [sic] Br. at 29. However, as this Court explained in 
Shields v. Harris, while 
Section 78-27-1 . . . provides that "an offer in writing 
to pay a particular sum of money . . . is, if not 
accepted, equivalent to the actual production and tender 
of the money[,]" Utah courts have interpreted this 
provision to mean a valid tender requires an "obligor to 
make a bona fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the 
amount of money due coupled with an actual production of 
the money or its equivalent." "It is not enough to simply 
inform the seller that the buyer is ready and willing to 
perform the contract as planned." 
934 P.2d 653, 655 (1997) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see 
also Carr, 781 P.2d at 1295 ("Without the formal act of tender, . 
. . [the Court is] left having to speculate about how [defendants] 
might have responded. Avoidance of such guesswork is one of the 
primary benefits of actually tendering one's performance and is a 
sound reason for rather strict adherence by the courts to the 
tender requirement."). 
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Not only did Defendants neglect to tender the purchase price, 
Plaintiffs also did not obtain loan approval prior to the REPC's 
expiration. This is significant, because, as in Carr, "the subject-
to-financing clause [of the REPC] was a condition precedent which 
[Plaintiffs] w[ere] obligated to satisfy . . . . Since [t]he[y] 
failed to do so, . . . [Defendants] w[ere] excused from [their] 
obligations under the contract." 781 P.2d at 1293. Hence, 
Defendants, like the defendants in Carr, 'Mw[ere] excused from 
performing [their] duties under the contract by reason of 
[P]laintiff[s]' conduct, especially [P]laintiff[s] ' failure to 
secure financing . . . . '" Ld. at 1295. Even assuming that none of 
the parties tendered, "[w]here the contract states[, as in the case 
at hand, ] that time is of the essence, cases hold that both parties 
are discharged from their contract obligations if neither makes 
tender by the agreed closing date." Webb, 645 P.2d at 55 n.l. 
Plaintiffs failed to tender their obligations, including a 
condition precedent, and their failure was not excused. Indeed, 
tender is excused only when it would be truly fruitless, such as 
"where the lienor states that he or she does not intend to accept 
payment, where the lienor claims a larger sum that he or she is 
entitled to collect, and where the lienor has coupled the 
legitimate claim with another claim." Jenkins v. Equipment Ctr., 
Inc. , 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (UtahCt. App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
None of these facts is present in the instant case. There is simply 
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no evidence that Defendants would not have accepted timely payment 
of the purchase price, and Defendants did not require a sum greater 
than the purchase price, but, rather, afforded Plaintiffs the 
opportunity to match a higher offer for the parcel only after the 
REPC expired. J. Farnsworth Dep. at 92:15-25; 94:8-14, R. 121-79. 
Defendants, therefore, are not "susceptible to a judgment for 
damages or a decree for specific performance." Kellev, 846 P.2d at 
1243. 
III. DEFENDANTS NEVER AGREED TO WAIVE THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THEREFORE PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE USED TO CREATE A LEASE OPTION THAT WAS 
NEVER AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES. 
Utah law is clear. To be binding, agreements for the purchase 
or lease of real estate must be written and executed by the seller. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than 
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest 
in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note 
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party by whom the lease or sale is to be made . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3. What is more, "[i]t is settled law that a 
modification of a contract must be in writing if the contract that 
is modified must be in writing under the Statute of Frauds." SCM 
Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1986). 
In SCM, the court confirmed these precepts, when it confronted 
a situation that resembles the one at hand. The plaintiff, in that 
case, "executed a . lease agreement," icl. at 106, but then 
argued that the defendant "orally promised . . . that [he could 
expand into . . . [additional] space" not covered by the written 
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terms of the parties' contract. Xd. In rendering its decision, the 
court "assume[d] for purposes of discussion that [the defendant] 
and [the plaintiff] made an oral agreement." Icl. at 107. 
Nevertheless, the court held that "[the plaintiff's] failure to 
obtain whatever promise or agreement it had with [the defendant] in 
writing made th[e] agreement unenforceable under the Statute of 
Frauds." Id. 
In explanation, the court stated that "any modification of 
[the lease] . . . must be in writing." Jd. at 108. The court 
further indicated that if the oral agreement were considered on its 
own, rather than as a modification, that it would likewise fail, 
because "[a]n agreement to enter into a future real estate lease 
for a period longer than a year is within the Statute of Frauds, 
and must be in writing to be enforceable." Jd. at 107. 
In the present case, although there was no oral agreement for 
a lease, even assuming that an oral lease option existed, such an 
agreement would not bind the parties. Whether evaluated as a 
separate contract or as a modification of the REPC, the Proposed 
Lease was not in writing and was not executed by Defendants. 
Reliance on promissory estoppel does not alter this result. As 
this Court explained in Stanql v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 
360-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), where real property is "involv[ed]," 
Utah cases have narrowly circumscribed the application of 
promissory estoppel to the statute of frauds. A defendant 
is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a 
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defense only when he or she has expressly and 
unambiguously waived the right to do so. 
In other words, "[p]romissory estoppel bars . . . asserti[on] 
[of] the statute . . . only where the party has clearly and 
unequivocally represented that it would not use it as a defense." 
Id. at 365-66. Thus, "a mere promise to execute a written contract 
and a subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create an 
estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage 
is sustained as a consequence of the refusal," McKinnon v. Corp., 
Etc., Latter-day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1974), even if 
"[t]he parties [have] agreed on lease terms and . . . ^promised to 
have the lease agreement drawn up.'" Stanql, 948 P. 2d at 361 
(quoting Easton v. Wvcoff, 295 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1956)). 
Identifying the policy underpinning enforcement of the statute 
of frauds in real estate cases, the Court explained: 
If this court were to reject prior Utah case law . . ., 
parties to a contract negotiation could not rely on the 
protections afforded by the statute of frauds, thereby 
"eviscerating" it. Moreover, contract negotiators would 
never know at what point mere negotiations became a 
binding contract. Parties to contract negotiations should 
be entitled to rely on the statute of frauds absent a 
clear manifestation of intent to claim no reliance. A 
party concerned about the assertion of the statute of 
frauds could easily protect itself by demanding written 
commitments before acting in reliance on the 
negotiations. 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs enumerate "a plethora of 
fact[s] . . ., but none involves conduct on the part of the 
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defendant[s] that is tantamount to a representation that [they] 
would not avail [themselves] of the Statute of Frauds.'' McKinnon, 
529 P. 2d at 437. Hence, Plaintiffs' facts," even if true, do not 
warrant promissory estoppel. Neither party contests that the REPC 
clearly stated that any amendment thereto had to be in writing, f 
6, and all the parties anticipated that the proposed lease had to 
be in writing. That is, after all, why Plaintiffs sent the written 
lease to Defendants for their signatures. R. 880:26:14-15, 21. In 
this case, promissory estoppel cannot defeat the statute of frauds, 
because there is simply no evidence that Defendants "clearly and 
unequivocally represented that [they] would not use [the statue of 
frauds] as a defense." Stanql, 948 P.2d at 365-366. 
IV. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT BY DEFENDANTS AND THE 
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES WAS NOT TIMELY. THEREFORE, THE COURT 
PROPERLY DENIED THE REQUEST FOR DAMAGES. 
Plaintiffs made no breach of contract claim in their amended 
complaints. Rather, they sought to add the claim by seeking to file 
a Third Amended Complaint after the entry of summary judgment. 
Defendants' objected to Plaintiffs' raising of the claim after the 
trial court had already granted summary judgment against 
Plaintiffs, and the trial court rightly denied the request to amend 
for a third time. 
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiffs were allowed to initiate a 
new claim after entry of summary judgment, they are not entitled to 
damages, because, as previously noted, " [n]either party to an 
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agreement c^an be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to a 
judgment for damages or a decree for specific performance) until 
the other party has tendered his own performance.'" Kellev, 846 
P.2d at 1243 (quoting Webb, 645 P.2d at 56) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs did not tender their 
performance. They did not obtain financing (a condition precedent 
to the enforceability of the REPC) , and they did not otherwise 
perform under the contract. Indeed, they set aside the REPC when 
they started negotiating a lease option. 
V. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT TIMELY RAISE THEIR CLAIM FOR BREACH 
OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND THERE 
CAN BE NO BREACH WHERE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PERFORM UNDER 
THE CONTRACT AND DEFENDANTS ONLY EXERCISED THEIR LEGAL 
AND CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS. 
In a fashion similar to their breach of contract claim, 
Plaintiffs first propounded a claim for breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing after the trial court granted summary 
judgment on the claims in their complaint. Plaintiffs raised the 
claim in a motion for reconsideration. Such a motion is not 
recognized by the Court, Radakovich v. Cornabv, 2006 UT App 454, f 
5, and this claim should not be entertained by the Court. 
"[E]ven if the issue were properly before this court, there is 
no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a 
party is simply exercising its contractual rights." Heiner v. S.J. 
Groves & Sons Co,, 790 P.2d 107, 115 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Defendants did act in good faith. They had no obligation to agree 
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to and sign the Proposed Lease unless the terms were satisfactory. 
When Plaintiffs allege Defendants would not close, by Plaintiffs' 
own sworn testimony, that means Defendants would not agree to the 
terms of the Proposed Lease. R. 880:47:21-48:4. Additionally, 
Defendants did not lie about a realtor problem. James, with whom 
Plaintiffs negotiated, was not aware of David's communication with 
the realtor about the problem until after October 30, 2004, J. 
Farnsworth Dep. at 84:18-22, R. 421-66, and Plaintiffs concede that 
they verified the listing on October 29, 2004, "confirm[ing] Jim's 
story and ma [king] them feel at ease." Pis.' Facts f 53, R. 419-20. 
Hence, their accusations of dishonesty are somewhat perplexing. 
After October 24, 2004, the REPC expired by its own terms. 
Thus, any attempt to delay a closing thereafter was unnecessary. 
And, Plaintiffs were awaiting Defendants' acceptance of the 
proposed lease by November 1st, the expiration date of Plaintiffs' 
offer for a lease option. R. 880:48:10-12/ 46:17-20; 47:21-48:4. 
There simply was no contract to close after October 24, 2004, and 
there was no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
REJECTING PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS, 
FOR A THIRD TIME, UNDER RULE 15, WHEN THE COURT HAD 
ALREADY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THEREBY DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiffs, citing Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Rule 15(b)), asked the trial court to conform their 
complaint to the evidence, apparently meaning the list of facts in 
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their motion for summary judgment, as well as to conform their 
complaint to allow claims raised after summary judgment. Rule 15(b) 
provides that "when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated . . . as if they had been raised in the pleadings." 
Whether Rule 15(b) may be invoked when there has not been a 
trial is a matter of disagreement. Blinn v. Beatrice Cmtv. Hosp. & 
Health Ctr. , 270 Neb. 809, 816 (2006). No Utah authority seems to 
directly address this issue, although one decades-old case, without 
analysis, appears to apply Rule 15(b) to circumstances in which the 
court granted summary judgment. Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 Utah 2d 111 
(1963). Clearly, however, the plain language of the rule requires 
a matter to be "tried" and makes reference to "the trial," Utah R. 
Civ. P. 15(b), leading one court to opine, "Rule 15(b) allows a 
court to revise pleadings to conform to the case as it actually was 
litigated at trial. The present case did not go to trial; it was 
decided on motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the situation 
which Rule 15(b) addresses simply did not arise in the present 
case."" Crawford v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Moreover, even if Rule 15(b) may be appropriately applied in 
the instant case, the trial court nevertheless properly denied 
Plaintiffs' motion to amend, because Defendants did not consent to 
consideration of issues outside the complaint and would have been 
prejudiced by consideration of them. Rule 15(b) is clear that its 
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use is limited to situations in which ''issues . . . are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties.'' 
"Express consent may be found when a party has stipulated 
to an issue or the issue is set forth in the pretrial 
order. 
Implied consent may arise in two situations. First, the 
claim may be introduced outside of the complaint - in 
another pleading or document - and then treated by the 
opposing party as if pleaded. Second, consent may be 
implied if during the trial the party acquiesces or fails 
to object to the introduction of evidence that relates 
only to that issue. 
Implied consent may not be found if the opposing party 
did not recognize that new matters were at issue during 
the trial. The pleader must demonstrate that the opposing 
party understood that the evidence in question was 
introduced to prove new issues. . . . 
[Hence,] A court may not find consent when evidence 
supporting an issue allegedly tried by implied consent is 
also relevant to other issues actually pleaded and 
tried." 
Blinn, 270 Neb. at 817 (quoting 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's 
Federal Practice § 15.18[1], at 15-75 to 15-77 (3d ed. 2005)) 
(emphasis removed). In short, "[t]o satisfy rule 15(b), evidence to 
which no objection is raised must be directed solely at the 
unpleaded issue, in order to provide a clear indication that the 
opposing party would or should have recognized that a new issue was 
being injected into the case." Blinn, 270 Neb. at 819. 
"Once a party objects to evidence at trial on the ground that 
it is outside the issues raised in the pleadings, . . . the second 
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rule 15(b) provision . . . applies." Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman 
Fin., 974 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1999). In these circumstances, 
[t]he trial court's discretion to grant amendment of the 
pleadings is conditioned on the satisfaction of two 
preliminary requirements: a finding that the presentation 
of the merits will be subserved by amendment and a 
finding that admission of such evidence would not 
prejudice the adverse party in maintaining his action or 
defense on the merits. 
Id. at 291 (quoting England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 345 (Utah 
1997)). 
In Fibro, "Brahman [, not unlike Plaintiffs,] argue[d] that the 
parties raised . . . [an] issue by implied consent because Fibro 
argued [about it] in its trial brief." 974 P.2d at 292. The court 
observed, "[h]owever, [that] Fibro also objected to the court's 
consideration of . . . [the issue] in that same trial brief," id., 
"during trial," id., and "post-trial." Id. As an "example [of a 
ground for denying amendment], . . . [the court stated that] Fibro 
m[ight] be able to establish that amendment would prejudice it 
because it had conducted discovery prior to . . . [the] raising [of 
the issue] and therefore had not focused discovery efforts on the 
. . . issue." Ld. n.1. 
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs attempted to add several 
claims to their complaint, following the trial court's ruling on 
summary judgment and after the court permitted them to twice amend 
their complaint prior to summary judgment. These claims included 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
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misrepresentation, specific performance and breach of contract. 
Defendants did not either expressly or impliedly consent to 
consideration of these issues. Indeed, as outlined in Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Conform the 
Complaint to the Evidence, Defendants strenuously objected to their 
tardy introduction. R. 649-60. 
Indeed, whenever it was apparent that Plaintiffs were 
attempting to introduce new claims (including those not briefed on 
appeal), Defendants consistently objected. After all, "[R]ule 
[15(b)] does not exist simply to ^allow parties to change theories 
mid-stream.'" Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 831 
(6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1198 (6th 
Cir. 1988) ) . 
Plaintiffs opted, for whatever reason, not to make certain 
claims they later wished to utilize. Defendants would clearly have 
been prejudiced by a decision to allow amendment, having prepared 
a case with defenses and discovery based upon the claims supplied 
in the First and Second Amended Complaints, and having successfully 
obtained summary judgment thereon. 
While rule 15 "permits the amendment of pleadings by the 
court, . . . the rule is to be applied with less 
liberality when the amendments are proposed during or 
after trial, rather than before trial. In any event, the 
granting of leave to amend is a matter which lies within 
the broad discretion of the [trial] court.'' 
Brown v. Jorqensen, 136 P. 3d 1252, 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) 
(citations omitted). In the instant case, as in Brown, it could 
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fairly be said that "[t]he trial court denied the 
[Plaintiffs'] motion and concluded that . . . [Plaintiffs] had 
ample opportunity to amend their pleadings much earlier and that 
*it would be fundamentally unfair to allow . . . [Plaintiffs] to . 
. . seek recovery of a different sort," ijd. (quoting the trial 
court), after the trial court granted summary judgment, 
particularly where the only new claim analyzed in Plaintiffs' 
summary judgment memorandum (aside from the three claims in the 
complaint) was a call for specific performance, which the trial 
court denied in its order on summary judgment. 
In other words, Plaintiffs not only asked for amendment based 
on arguments that were not in the first three complaints, but also, 
in large part, asked for amendment based on claims introduced in 
filings, such as their motion for reconsideration, that followed 
the trial court's ruling on summary judgment. Even under a very 
generous reading, Rule 15(b) does not, by its plain language, allow 
a court to amend a complaint to allow claims raised after the 
completion of trial to be deemed pleaded. Though the amendment may 
take place after trial, the initial raising of the claims may not. 
The trial court properly denied the motion. 
VII. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-40-2.5 GOVERNS THE RELEASE OF LIS 
PENDENS, AND THE SAME IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5 sets forth the procedure to obtain 
a release of a notice of lis pendens even when a case is pending. 
The statute provides that "a party to the action, can ask the court 
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to release a lis pendens at "any time after a notice has been 
recorded/' Utah Code § 78-40-2.5(2) (emphasis added). The statute 
then states that "[a] court shall order a notice released if . . . 
(a) the court receives a motion to release . . ; and (b) the 
court finds that the claimant has not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real 
property claim . . . ." Utah Code § 78-40-2.5(3). 
Plaintiffs filed a notice of lis pendens when they filed this 
action. The trial court then granted summary judgment and dismissed 
all Plaintiffs' claims. Because Defendants filed the requisite 
motion and Plaintiffs did not establish the viability of their 
claim, the trial court granted Defendants' motion. R. 838-42. 
Plaintiffs, for the first time on appeal, challenge the 
constitutionality of that statute on a basis other than that it 
infringes upon due process rights in terms of its interference with 
the right to appeal. R. 741-46. This issue may also be moot since 
the trial court issued a stay on November 21, 2006. R. 876. If the 
Court decides to address this issue, then, as an initial point, 
Plaintiffs "bear a heavy burden," State Ex Rel. Z.C., 128 P.3d 561, 
564 (Utah Ct. App. 2005), because courts of this state "are guided 
by the rule that "while ruling on the constitutionality of a 
statute, [they] will resolve doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.'" Id. (quoting State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 
(Utah 1995)). Indeed, "[i]t is . . . one of the important functions 
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of the Legislature to change and modify the law . . . ," Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985), and "due process 
[does not] constitutionalize [ ] the common law or otherwise 
freeze[] the law." Id. 
Plaintiffs were not denied due process under the statute. They 
had an opportunity to present arguments on the motion, and there is 
nothing in the statute that prohibited the Plaintiffs from 
appealing the decision of the trial court, and, thus, there is no 
abridgement of any right to appeal, or to seek a stay pending 
appeal. Although, as this Court noted, Plaintiffs may have erred 
when they did not bring a separate appeal, as the attempt to remove 
the lis pendens could be deemed an enforcement action. R.852-53. 
Any such appeal would now be untimely, and no stay could issue. 
The legislature's aim to expedite release of an unsupported 
lis pendens is a worthy one. The damages suffered by maintenance of 
the notice in this case include possible loss of the sale and the 
proceeds from that sale to Gibson and interest on the purchase 
price. The longer the lis pendens remains, the greater the risk to 
Defendants. 
VIII. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE PREVAILING PARTIES AND ARE 
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVERY OF THEIR FEES. 
In this case, Plaintiffs sought to enforce the Proposed Lease 
under the theories of fraud, waiver and promissory estoppel, and, 
secondarily, the REPC under the fraud theory. Second Amended 
Complaint 55 32-38, R. 467-73. A request was made for fees in the 
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Second Amended Complaint, but that claim, which was not pursued 
further prior to summary judgment, is now raised on appeal. 
Plaintiffs do not argue their fraud theory on appeal. Thus, they 
did not and cannot prevail on enforcement of the REPC. Since they 
are not the prevailing party, they cannot recover fees under the 
REPCs terms. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
IX: THE FILING OF THE LIS PENDENS WAS IN BAD FAITH AND 
THE REFUSAL TO RELEASE IT CONSTITUTES A WRONGFUL LIEN. 
On this issue, the Defendants invite the Court to adopt the 
approach of Florida in assessing whether a lis pendens, filed when 
a claim is without merit, is a wrongful lien. In India America 
Trading, Co. v. White, 896 So. 2d 859, 859 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 
2005), "India America executed a written offer to purchase 120 
acres of real property from Wesley White.'' The offer required 
acceptance by a certain date, and White did not accept the offer 
thereby. Jd.. "When White refused to sell the real property to India 
America," jld. , India America brought breach of contract and fraud 
claims. Id. 
The court surmised, however, that "even if White had orally 
agreed to sell the real property to India America, the oral 
contract would have been unenforceable pursuant to . [the] 
statute of frauds." Id. at 860. The court further observed that 
"even though the defendant may not have intended to perform the 
oral contract at the time when he made the oral promise, the action 
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for fraud and deceit could not be maintained based on the statute 
of frauds." Id. at 361. 
Thus, the court opined that "India America's fraud count [wa]s 
nothing more than an action to enforce an oral contract for the 
sale of land and therefore, d[id] not constitute a good faith, 
viable claim necessary to support a lis pendens." Id. Addressing 
the issue of reliance, the court stated: 
India America alleged that [it] relied on White's 
misrepresentation that he would sell the real property to 
India America. However, the record, which includes the 
written offer, contradicts this allegation. Specifically, 
the written offer provides that the contract is not 
binding unless accepted and delivered to White before a 
specific date. Therefore, by the terms of its offer, 
India America could not have believed that it had a 
binding contract based upon their oral communications. 
Id. 
Similarly, in the case at hand, Plaintiffs abandoned the REPC 
and then submitted the Proposed Lease which required acceptance by 
November 1, 2004. Proposed Lease, Addendum J, SI 16. Ty acknowledged 
that Defendants did not accept the lease option by November 1, 
2004. R. 880:48:10-12. Plaintiffs argue that their case is not 
frivolous. In White, however, the court came to the opposite 
conclusion on similar facts (though there was no oral contract in 
the instant case), writing that the "action to enforce an oral 
contract for the sale of land . . . d[id] not constitute a good 
faith, viable claim necessary to support a lis pendens." 896 So. 2d 
at 861. 
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In Utah, the wrongful lien statute provides that it "[does] 
not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens." Utah Code § 38-9-
2(2). The Utah Supreme Court has, however, expounded that a "[lis 
pendens'] only foundation is the action filed - it has no existence 
independent of it." Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190 (1976). 
Moreover, "[i]n Utah, a lis pendens may only be filed in connection 
with an action (1) 'affecting the title' to real property, or (2) 
'affecting . . . the right of possession of real property.'" 
Winters v. Schulman, 977 P. 2d 1218, 1223 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
(quoting Utah Code § 78-40-2). " 'Utah law does not allow for the 
filing of a lis pendens in cases seeking a money judgment.'" 
Winters, 977 P.2d at 1224 (quoting Busch v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432, 
436 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992)). 
It was, therefore, improper for Plaintiffs to file a lis 
pendens when they could not compel specific performance of the REPC 
having not performed under the same. Similarly, as in White, the 
filing of a lis pendens in this case, based upon an unaccepted 
proposal, was likewise wrongful. Indeed, although the right to file 
a lis pendens seems quite broad under the statute, it seems 
improbable that legislators intended to allow any lis pendens, 
though technically an allowable filing, to be permissible, if it 
was premised upon a frivolous filing. 
Additionally, in the instant case, the trial court found, 
based on the testimony of Plaintiffs at a hearing on November 29, 
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that the REPC was not enforceable, that the purchase price had not 
been tendered and that the closing date had not been met. R. 47-50. 
Following that hearing, a notice was given to Plaintiffs, by a 
letter dated December 22, 2004, requesting that their lis pendens 
be released and explaining that the filing of the lis pendens was 
wrongful, especially in light of the trial court's findings and 
ruling. R. 522-33 (Exhibit A therein). Plaintiffs refused to 
release the lis pendens. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 provides that if a person refuses to 
release a wrongful lien, he or she is liable for treble damages and 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. In this case, once the court 
ruled that the REPC was not enforceable, Plaintiffs had a duty to 
release the lis pendens. A refusal to do so was wrongful, and 
Defendants should be awarded treble damages together with their 
attorney fees and costs. 
Plaintiffs request that this Court rule, as did the Florida 
court, that a good faith claim must underpin a lis pendens. In this 
case, the REPC was unenforceable and the trial court so ruled in 
December 2004. The proposed lease was likewise unenforceable as the 
terms were never agreed upon and the document was never signed by 
Defendants. Plaintiffs filed the lis pendens to try to prevent 
Defendants from selling the property, which was an improper motive. 
Defendants are entitled to the damages incurred because of the 
improper filing. 
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X. DEFENDANTS, AS THE PREVAILING PARTIES, ARE ENTITLED TO 
REIMBURSEMENT OF THEIR LEGAL FEES AND COSTS. 
The trial court awarded Defendants the fees they incurred in 
defending against the injunction request, based on the terms of 
Rule 65A regarding preliminary injunctions. The court, however, 
denied the request for additional fees under the terms of the REPC, 
finding that the REPC had been abandoned by the parties. R. 661-69. 
At first blush, the result may seem correct, until one realizes the 
policy such a result begets, where, as in this case, Plaintiffs 
continue to attempt to enforce the REPC, including on this appeal, 
and Defendants have to defend against those claims. 
"
AIn Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by 
statute or contract. If provided for by contract, attorney fees are 
awarded in accordance with the terms of that contract.'" Panos v. 
Olsen and Assoc. Constr., Inc., 123 P.3d 816, 822 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005) (quoting Foster v. Montgomery, 82 P. 3d 191, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003)). Paragraph 17 of the REPC at issue provides: "In the event 
of litigation . . . to enforce the Contract, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees." 
In this case, Plaintiffs sought to enforce the REPC under a 
fraud theory. Second Amended Complaint M 32-38, R. 467-473. They 
have also, following summary judgment, sought damages for breach of 
that contract. Hence, although Plaintiffs efforts were generally 
focused on having the court bind Defendants to the Proposed Lease, 
to which they had not agreed and which they were still negotiating, 
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Plaintiffs did allege that the REPC should be enforced under the 
fraud theory to which Defendants had to mount a successful defense, 
and Defendants continue to have to set forth arguments against 
Plaintiffs' claims raised both before and after summary judgment. 
Carr buttresses the conclusion that Defendants should be 
awarded their attorney fees. In Carr, the plaintiff requested 
specific performance of a purchase contract. This Court upheld the 
trial court's decision denying specific performance, due to 
nonperformance of contract terms by the plaintiff. 781 P. 2d at 
1296. The Court then addressed the issue of attorney fees. Id. 
The fees provision in the contract stated: M>If either party 
fails to perform, he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this 
agreement, or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee.'" id. (Emphasis in 
original). The Court, applying this language, concluded that Smith 
was not entitled to attorney fees, because "Smith took an entirely 
defensive posture and was not enforcing any right arising under the 
agreement or arising from a breach thereof." Id. 
However, while the Court determined that "[Smith] [wa]s not 
entitled to attorney fees under the provision at issue," id. , 
because the provision was "not comprehensive but . . . limited in 
scope," id., the Court proclaimed that "Smith would surely be 
entitled to attorney fees under the more typical provision awarding 
fees to the prevailing party." id. Supplying an example of such a 
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proviso, the Court referred to Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. 
Neale, 776 P. 2d 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Id. The attorney fee 
section of the agreement in this case and the provision in Neale 
are almost identical. 
The Neale provision reads: "In the event of commencement of 
suit by either party to enforce the provisions of this agreement, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive attorney's fees 
and costs ." 776 P.2d at 648 (emphasis in original). 
Similarly, the REPC in the instant case states: "In the event of 
litigation . . . to enforce this Contract, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees." Addendum 
I, 1 17. 
Neale also offers this straightforward insight: "[T]ypically, 
determining the ^prevailing party' for purposes of awarding fees 
and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues defendant; if plaintiff 
is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant 
successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment, defendant has 
prevailed." Id., at 648. In this case, as outlined above, Plaintiffs 
did not receive their requested relief. Defendants, meanwhile, have 
"successfully defend[ed]." Id. 
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that no fees could be 
awarded because the contract became unenforceable due to 
nonperformance and abandonment by the parties. R. 661-669. However, 
in Carr, the defending party's "position . . . was that there was 
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no viable contract left to enforce/' Ici. at 1296. Yet, this Court 
averred that "Smith would surely be entitled to attorney fees under 
the . . . typical provision awarding fees to the prevailing party." 
Id. This result promotes a policy that protects parties who must 
defend against an otherwise unenforceable contract, and holds 
accountable parties who seek to enforce an otherwise unenforceable 
contract. Without such a policy, a party who successfully defends 
in a contract action might never be able to recover fees. 
Finally, Defendants are not only entitled to attorney fees for 
proceedings before the trial court, but also before this Court, 
should Defendants prevail on appeal, in accordance with the REPC's 
terms. Panos, 123 P.3d at 822 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (awarding fees 
on appeal under a like provision). Thus, Defendants respectfully 
request that this Court reverse the trial court's decision as to 
attorney fees, and award Defendants the fees incurred before the 
trial court and this Court to defend against Plaintiffs' action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request 
that the trial court's decision granting summary judgment for the 
Defendants, thereby dismissing the Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint, be sustained, that the trial court's ruling as to 
wrongful lien be reversed and that the case be remanded with 
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direction to award Defendants the attorney fees and costs incurred 
before the trial court and on appeal. 
Dated this Z^ f day of November 2006, 
ALLRED ^McCiELLAN, P.C, 
Attorneys.for Appellee 
By: / .y^ttk _ 
\Claf1c B Alfred 
By: 
Brad D. Brotherson 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4 
Excerpts from Transcripts of Temporary Injunction Hearing 
November 29, 2004 
Ruling and Order, January 11, 2006 
Ruling and Order, March 29, 2006 
Order, April 26, 2006 
Ruling, May 15, 2006 
Ruling and Order, August 16, 2006 
Ruling and Order, November 21, 2006 
Real Estate Purchase Contract, August 27, 2004 
Residential Lease With Option to Purchase, October 5, 2004 
ADDENDUM A 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4 
Civil liability for filing wrongful lien - Damages 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien 
as defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office 
of the county recorder against real property is liable to a record 
interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused by the 
wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to 
release or correct the wrongful lien within ten days from the date 
of written request from a record interest holder of the real 
property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address 
of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record interest 
holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is 
greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for 
$3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for 
reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or causes 
to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-
1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, 
knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim 
ADDENDUM B 
II Page 1 i 
1 Q. What i s your c u r r e n t o c c u p a t i o n ? 
2 A. We're s e l f - e m p l o y e d . We own a c a r p e t and u p h o l s t e r y 
3 c l e a n i n g b u s i n e s s . 
4 Q. You say we, you mean you and your w i f e ? 
5 A. My w i f e and I . Yes . 
6 Q. And how long have you had the carpet cleaning and 
7 flupholstery b u s i n e s s ? 
8 A. T h i s i s t h e e i g h t h y e a r . 
9 Q. Are you a r e a l e s t a t e p r o f e s s i o n a l ? 
10 A. N o . 
11 Q. Do you have any college education in real estate? 
12 I  A. None . 
13 Q. Is your wife, excuse me, did you say your wife works 
14 jwith you in the business? 
15 II A. She does work with us. Yes. 
16 Q. And did there come a time when you were looking for 
17 [property in Duchesne County? 
18 I A. Yes. 
19 Q. And tell us how you found the property. 
20 A. I was searching the internet. 
21 Q. And you found, describe what you found on the 
22 internet. 
23 A. I found the ranch for sale in Neola. 
24 Q. Did you contact anybody in regards to this? 
25 A. Yes. 
1 I  Q. Who did you contact9 
2 A. I contacted Jim. He had his cell phone number on the 
3 [website. 
4 Q. And when did you make these contacts9 
5 A, It: was in late July or early August. 
6 Q. And tell me the substance of your first conversation 
7 [with Mr. Farnsworth. 
8 11 A. I basically just asked him that I was interested in 
9 the property and wanted to go take a look at it. He gave me 
10 directions on how to drive out and find it and ray wife and I 
11 drove out and found it and toured the property. 
12 Q. At what time, did there come a time when you actually 
13 flmet with Mr. Farnsworth? 
14 A. After we toured it we were real interested in it and 
15 it was more than we expected so we made arrangements to meet 
16 with him to get the key to the house. We met in Heber City and 
17 the next day we drove out and toured the inside of the house. 
18 Q. And about when was this9 
19 A. I believe that was on the-fifteenth roughly. It was a 
20 Sunday that we drove up. 
21 Q. About the fifteenth of August. Is that correct? 
22 A. Of August. 
23 I  Q. So you toured the property. You liked the property. 
24 |t)id you get back in touch with Mr. Farnsworth again0 
25 || A. The next time, yes. We talked on the phone back and 
1 I  A. The date that he prepared it or signed it, looks like 
2 [lit was the twenty-fourth of August. And then we signed it a 
3 few days later. 
4 Q. Okay. This happened at the end August. Did you have 
5 another meeting with Mr. Farnsworth after this time? 
6 A. We met him at the property, and again it would have 
7 Dbeen on a weekend, and we walked through the property. He kind 
8 of showed me a little bit about the watering system. But 
9 mainly that was to clarify any of the personal property issues 
10 that we had. 
11 Q. Did you discuss what personal property was going to go 
12 flwith the farm? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Give us some short idea of what was being included 
15 with the sale according to our understanding. 
16 A. All of the furniture in the home. I mean dishes, you 
17 name it. Everything that was on the property including some of 
18 the farm equipment. A baler, hay-wagon, frother, four wheeler, 
19 three wheeler. 
20 Q. Let me direct your attention to Plaintiffs Exhibit 
21 One. At the top there is an indication of an earnest money 
22 amount of a thousand dollars. Did you provide a check in the 
23 amount of a thousand dollars? 
24 A. Yes. 

























A T lr-?i it--- *•'• c. <2».t _ t. t_ J^ii.. 
Q. And it says on here it was received by Basin Land and 
Title. 
A. That's who the check was made out to That was the 
title company that we were working on. 
Q. Okay. And then there's a description of the property 
and then a short description of some excluded items. 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you go down to paragraph two, there's a purchase 
{price. The amount has been scratched through of three hundred 
forty thousand and three hundred and thirty-nine thousand with 
some initials. Do you know whose initials those are? 
A. Those are Jim's. 
Q. Okay. And that reflects the change in the final 
[purchase price? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Paragraph 2.3 requires application for financing. And 
that was to be done (inaudible) representation by September 
first. Did you make a loan application prior to September 
first? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who did you apply with? 
A. Washington Mutual. 
Q. And what did they tell you'' 
A. Initially told us that everything looked good. Our 
iicredit was excellent- We' ri dnne work with them before Tins 
roperty was larger than, what they normally loan on but they, 
tht-> linn oj finer saxd with our credit that the underwriter 
should be able to make an exception on this property. 
Q. Did there come a time whei i Washington Mutual objected 
to making the loan? 
A Yes,,. 
"I'll.!- 1 I II "« Whl , I I 111 i l i p l H !'I M.I . 
They notified i is tl lat 1 J: ie we] 1 actually what 
IO||happened that the appraiser was supposed to go apprai.se the 
1 1 ([property and I guess he or she talked n and once the, 
12 appraiser .found out that i t was a working t H rm. 
1.3 j MF A LLREE Objed (. i i ai i :i i b l e ) 1 t ;if>pea I s wt~> ' i v 
14 getting some hearsay (inaudible) some appraiser. 
15 THE COURT: Well, if it came from Jim, we're going .o 
16 let him talk about it. 
17 MR. ALLRED: I understood he was talking about what 
1 8 (but some appraiser was I e L 1 j rig him . 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 B Y IMI'M hUNlM;iM- H 
21 Q - * \e just clarify that, •Your Hoi lor So there wi 1 1 
22 pe no misunders1 ai i< i i i :ig . U 1 1 i m a 1 1 * 1 ;;lf ; i h a t :Ii d Was 1 iii igt : »n Mut:ua,1 
23 tell you? 
24 A That they wouldn't loan on a working farm. 




















Q. D i d you clc a n y t h i n g e l s e to c /btaif i f i n a n c i n g DM Lh^ 
r o p e r t y 1 
Q. Were you u l t i m a t e l y a b l e t o o b t a i n u l t i m a t e f i n a n c i n g 
A Y ^ s . 
Q. And who offered to provide that financing for you? 
(What financial institution? 
A. Through American National. 
Q. Did you relay any of this information to Mr. 
Farnsworth? 
A. Well, in between that, we had started talking to Wells 
(Fargo, Zions and Western (inaudible) Credit and we, I mean the^ 
[wanted us to put up a big proposal on how we' re going to make 
[money farming. I talked to Jim about that I actually asked him 
to help me draw up a, you know, a business plan to make money 
on the farm. But I also told him at about the same time that, 
[you know, we would get this property one way or another and 
then I started mentioning to him different financing options. 
[And the lease option was one of them. 
Q. Did Mr. Farnsworth indicate to you that they had any 
interest in that lease option9 
A. Initially not much. I mean, but he called me back a 
day or two later and said he really lxked the idea of the lease 
option. 
i~i Pi -J r-i r\ «=> <=> v r^ . i a - n r -^ \r r\ \ \ u/ *h\ *. r n. a 1 -. V c i n t- K ^ r- > 
J f c . _ -I. _ £ . J _ - . . . . . J - - W A - . . W W V * t_* t sA _ . 
A. He liked the idea because if we defaulted on it he 
wouldn't Iiavi" t»> f i >r *>r 1 ose . i! wt i I .1 i, t , everything would 
still be I n his name And I really liked it because it gave me 
an opportunity to do a ten thirty one Rxrhanqe mi arini her p i e c e 
6 of property that I currently own. 
7 ( : :i - J..M, commence discussions with him about the 
8 t e r 
9 A E x t e n s i v e l y . 
10 Q. L e t m e s h o w y o u a dt uini'tit w l i n - h l i r , b»>i 11 IIIL -J r k( i i i 
11 E x h i b i t v*,^ n ^ yon r e c o g n i z e t h i s document? 
12 A 
13 Q , I i" I I l ln < i MI i t bhftal t h i s d o c u m e n t is° 
14 * "I h i s i JI t h e copy of t h e Lease o p t i o n t h a t we* p r e p a r e d 
15 t o s e n d t o J i m t<> l imi t u v f i, :iinl M u i i . i«.»Mil wu t h o u g h t w a s 
16 g o i n g f^ happen. We a l r e a d y agreed in p r i n c i p l e t o t h e t e r m s 
17 of t h i s p u r c h a s e agreement . 
18 ' h e r e a r e s i g n a t u r e s on the s e c o n d page of t h i s 
19 document. Can you t e l l ~n._se s i g n a t u r e s t h o s e are? 
20 II A . T l in r , i ' a i t ; mi i in mv w i f e ' s 
2111 Q. And t h e r e ' s a d a t e , October f i f t h . I s t h i s t l le d a t e 
22 t h i *i -\u | »i y p t i ! i" 1} 
23 | | A. Yes 
-4 II Q. A t a n y t i m e p r i o r t o November f i r s t d i d Mr . F a r n s w o r t h 
e v e r t e l l you t h a t h e r e f u s e d t o e n t e r i n t o a l e a s e o p t i o n 
A. No. 
3 Q. At any time prior to November first did you ever tell 
4 HMr Farnsworth f.hat- you ^nnld not arrange financing to purchase 
5 the property? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. If Mr. Farnsworth had told you at any time that he 
8 would not do the lease option, did you believe you had other 
9 financing options available to you? 
10 A. Sure. 
11 Q. And that included a commitment from American National 
12 Bank? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Concerning Plaintiffs Exhibit Number Two, you stated 
15 that set forth the terms that you had discussed with Mr. 
16 [Farnsworth. Did Mr. Farnsworth ever make or suggest any 
17 amendments to these terms? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. What changes did he suggest? 
20 A. Initially when he got the contract he called me and 
21 he, we were going to make some changes to the timing on the 
22 payments for the lease, basically to protect me in case 
23 something was lost in the mail that the option would not expire 
24 immediately. There would be a longer term, you know, just so 
25 the option wouldn't disappear. 
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Q . A nd information? When you sent that , wha tlf d y c »u d o ^ 
|Ma i 3 t t< :: • J:i i i FVi t n swi i r t h? 
Y P « ? 
5 Q_ He said, he initially showed no xnterest in xt but 
6 later di*^ 
7 II A. All the terms of this agreement we. had hashed out over 
8 (Ion t h e L e l e p h u i i ^ W< • .i<;) f ee<.l I \m .• m a yl h i m ) i 11 I h i •• i.niil" t a c t 
9 {before I submitted it to him. 
10 Q. Your testimony* was tnau ixe showed no interest but 
1 1 later said that he, that it did some interest to hi m because I 
12 remember you were interested because of a ten twenty-three 
13 (i,i ia.ii ii J :i fal e ) I s s ::i t ? I /a: s I (. i I. n ic I i bJ e) ? 
14 A. Okay. Before this was ever prepared. 
15 Q. that was before October (inautfxbis} 
16 A. When, I was talking to Wei Is Fargo, Zi ons and Western 
17 (inaudible) Cred i t,. • • • talking back ai id f or th to
 w .
 >T
 L 1 ie 
18 telephone P** weJ J Ana ~, it was kind of frustratinc sealing 
19 with those banks because they wanted, they were loan i •» tK.t* 
20 prnoi i ey t J i nil i I i i in i I'M) pHi ,'iOpc I i i- 1 ili nt I Ii i v i • a n y • c e 
21 farming so you know, I talked to Jim, I said "Jim, worse case 
^ ? I s e n a r i o
 r w e
ir
 v e . -: I <•' c 1 i a s e t.! i e j: > i: c • p e r t y '' 
23 I started throwing up some of the worst case senarios, that's 
24 llowner financing. 






















Q. I'm just trying to figure out, you said you preparer 
Exhibit Two and mailed it to him sometime on or after October 
f:^^u. .?"d *-hf»n yon said that there were, and then you started 
having, it's my understanding that you had discussions after 
that in timing terms, and what we're really looking at is you 
discussed changing the line sixteen where you put a November 
first, two thousand four date for an acceptance. You talked 
about changing that. My understanding was you then, you 
[mailed it to Mr. Farnsworth and had some discussion about 
changing some of the terms. 
A. Some of the information, we talked on the telephone 
about some of the terms when he got it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. They were, I mean, I hadn't modified this generic 
contract so the terms were as what we talked about. And I 
talked about the one item of the payment being late. 
Q. Well, you talked as I understood it, changing the date 
for acceptance, who's paying the water, who pays the taxes, 
those things all occured after you mailed this and sent it to 
him? Is my understanding correct there? 
Q. He just wanted those items specifically included. 
Q. Did you ever reach an agreement on any of those terms? 
h, Absolutely 
Q. Then you said that, I guess you decided to look in the 
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see youi -jnature on it. Was it ever signed by any of the 
[Defendants? 
3 I I 
4 1 Q ou » - v e r r e c e i v e d a s i g n e d copy of t h a t ' 7 
5 11 A . I N U . 
"6 || 0 You sa id that the twenty-fourth came and past and y < : • i i 
7 | (inaudible) set a date to eJt ose the lease? 
8 || A ! "W"„,t', ui ' idi?Ie l o c o i i t ax I It 11 - waq out- o f ^ o w n . 
• 9 II Q At any time prior to October twen t y - f oux t n .d ,*<»u 
10 ever take a check to Basin Lane 
11 * No, 
12 I.ltd you e v e r t a k e t h e money t o Bas in Land and T i t l e ? 
13 1\ 
14 Did y oi i ever send any of the Defendants a check for 
15 the closinq p:II i ce? 
16 A. No... They only had the earnest money. 
17 Q . As of , as of October fifth , you had replaced y oi n i: ea 3 
18 estate purchase contract wi th Exh. i b:i t Two, the lease Wasn t. 
19 lit? 
20 A, * lought was happening. 
21 Q. And .actually y ou had changed, the original closing 
22 date, thi/i'p" M .ui acceptance date of sixteen which is November 
23 Hone t .wo thousand lour. 
24 
25 
A. That's correct 

























Q And you had not obtained any loan for the property. 
Had you? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. As of October twenty-fourth, you didn't have a loan 
for it. Did you? 
A. I had financing available. 
Q. You say you have a commitment that's dated in 
[November. That's all you've got. 
A. That's correct. And I could have closed this. 
Q. And you've never tendered one dime to anybody. Had 
|you? 
A. Other than the earnest money. I've never tendered an 
[(money. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
IBY MR. LUNDGREN: 
Q. I draw your attention to Exhibit Number One. That is 
the document you signed first for the property. Is that 
Icorrect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then during the period of time that you were 
obtaining financing, is it your testimony that you had 
understood that Mr. Farnsworth preferred the lease option? 


























4 1' i ii is u i ' i r I 11 t ,-i \ i i | i r i.1 f €3 1 »:* • IV H 1 J y n ' ' a " L O 
jwhether l jo mi a cash purchase or whether he would 
[prefer going on a lease option? 
A Not necessarily. But he did call me back and tell me 
that he liked the idea of the lease option while I was pursuing 
t h e c a s h f i n a n c i n g . 
y Was il your mtent during your discussions with Mr. 
|Farn'•;wn r t It i 11 «" d e r s t a n d i i lg :i i :i y o u r • 
(discussions with Mr Farnsworth that by entering into the leane 
option that any of your rights under the purchase ag 
[would be cancelled? 
A 
Q 1 1 J ">„ u have an understanding that i £ the lease option 
|did not work out as to whether oz not the purchase option was 
stil I aval I aLi. I e? 
Yes. 'I assumed that it was and I specificall told 
Ihim that x wanted to execute the iear;p 'pi i , MilLiii .M 
frame of the original purchase contract. 
». If at any time after October twentieth, Mr. Farnsworth 
|would have stated to you you've got to come up with the three 
hundred and thirty-nine thousand dollars, would you have been 
ial. to do that ? 
Yes . 
i whom ? 
_ good friend, Mr. Paul Ensalmi, that just walked into 
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JAMES L. FARNSWORTH, DAVID 
FARNSWORTH, and GREGORY 
FARNSWORTH, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
CASE NO. 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. That motion was filed with the Court on 
August 26, 2005, and was accompanied by a supporting memorandum. 
The Plaintiffs filed a memo in opposition to that motion on No-
vember 01, 2005. The Plaintiffs' opposition memo also included 
Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court notes 
that it has not yet received a request for a decision on Plain-
tiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Defendants filed 
with the Court a reply memo on their motion for summary judgment 
on November 14, 2005, which included a request for oral argument 
on the motion. The Court entertained oral argument on December 
19, 2005, and having received a notice to submit this motion for 
decision on November 18, 2005, the Court now issues its ruling 
and enters its order on the Defendants' summary judgment motion. 
This case started when the parties entered into a real es-
tate purchase contract ("the REPC,/) on August 24, 2004, which 
contract was to close by October 24, 2004. As part of an order 
entered on December 20, 2004, the Court has previously made 
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findings that the Plaintiffs encountered difficulty obtaining 
financing for the transaction and the parties began discussing 
alternative means to finance the transaction. See Order, pg. 2 
(filed December 21, 2004). It appears that the Plaintiffs sug-
gested a lease with an option to purchase ("the Lease Option") 
in lieu of obtaining conventional financing to purchase the 
property outright.1 The parties began negotiating the terms of 
the Lease Option sometime in the middle of September and contin-
ued to negotiate beyond the October 24, 2004 closing date speci-
fied in the REPC. Ultimately, no lease with an option to pur-
chase was ever signed by the parties and the REPC never closed 
within the timeframe established by the REPC. In November 2004, 
the Defendants sold the property which was the subject of the 
REPC to a third party. 
The Plaintiffs brought suit against the Defendants for 
breach of contract, seeking: 1) specific performance of the 
REPC; 2) an injunction barring the sale of the property; and 3) 
damages and costs. The Plaintiffs have subsequently amended 
their complaint to include the following causes of action: 1) 
waiver; 2) fraud; and 3) promissory estoppel. Based upon those 
theories, the Plaintiffs are still seeking specific performance 
of the REPC or the Lease Option.2 There are three issues the 
Court must address in order to rule upon the Defendants' summary 
judgment motion: 1) the statute of frauds as it relates to 
Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim; 2) the Plaintiffs' fraud 
claim; and 3) waiver issues. Each will be addressed in turn. 
1
 Conventional financing was specified in the REPC. See "Defendant's Memoran-
dum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," Exhibit C (filed August 26, 
2005). 
2
 In their Second Amended Complaint, a copy of which is attached to Plain-
tiffs' "Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform with the Evidence," filed on 
December 13, 2005, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to "order the Defendants to 
enter into, complete and honor the lease option agreement" OR "alternately 
allow the Plaintiffs to complete the purchase agreement with conventional fi-
nancing . " 
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I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS and PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
Statutes of frauds are intended to bar enforcement of cer-
tain agreements that the law requires to be memorialized in 
writing. The relevant statute of frauds reads: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in 
lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2005). Both of the contracts at issue 
in this action, 1) the REPC which was entered into by the par-
ties in august 2004 and 2) the Lease Option which was never exe-
cuted between the parties, are required by the express language 
of the statute to be memorialized in writing to be enforceable. 
Because the REPC was in writing, it satisfied the statute 
of frauds and was therefore an enforceable agreement between the 
parties. However, neither of the parties to the REPC performed 
under the terms of that agreement.3 It appears that once the 
Plaintiffs encountered difficulty obtaining the conventional fi-
nancing specified in the REPC, and began negotiating the Lease 
Option instead, the REPC was abandoned by both parties. Either 
way, it is clear from the record that the date for settlement 
under the REPC passed without full performance by either party. 
While the parties are free to sue each other for defaulting un-
der the REPC, seeking specific performance (an equitable remedy) 
requires "clean hands," see LHIW, Inc. v. De Lorean, 753 P.2d 
961, 963 (Utah 1988), which, due to non-performance, neither of 
the parties possesses under the REPC. 
Furthermore, because the Lease Option was never reduced to 
writing and signed by the Defendants, it cannot satisfy the 
statute of frauds and therefore is unenforceable. The Plain-
3
 The Defendants apparently did not provide seller disclosures or title com-
mitments. See "Plaintiffs' Cross Motion," pg. 3 (filed November 01, 2005). 
Similarly, the Plaintiffs never tendered the purchase price. See "Defen-
dants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," pg . 4 (filed 
August 26, 2005) . 
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tiffs argue that the Lease Option should be enforced regardless 
of the statute of frauds based upon a theory of promissory es-
toppel. The Utah Supreme Court has defined promissory estoppel, 
stating: 
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or 
a third person and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may 
be limited as justice requires. 
Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843, 
845 (Utah 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 
(1981)). Under this definition, the Plaintiffs would be enti-
tled to the relief they seek if they could establish a promise, 
reasonable reliance, and injustice. 
However, there are limits to the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel when real property is involved. These limits have been 
addressed by the Utah courts. In support of their motion for 
summary judgment, Defendants cite F.C. Stangle v. Earnst Home 
Centers, 948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997). In Stangle, the Utah 
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of "whether, promissory es-
toppel precludes [a defendant] from asserting the statute of 
frauds as a defense." Stangle, 948 P.2d at 360. This issue is 
a matter of law, properly decided by this Court on summary judg-
ment. I_ci. The Stangle court stated, 
in situations involving the purchase or lease of real prop-
erty, [] Utah cases have narrowly circumscribed the appli-
cation of promissory estoppel to the statute of frauds. A 
defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds 
as a defense only when he or she has expressly and unambi-
guously waived the right to do so. 
Stangle, 948 P.2d at 360-61 (emphasis added). Moreover, a mere 
refusal to perform an oral agreement within the statute of 
frauds, however, is not such fraud as will justify a court in 
disregarding the statute of frauds even though it results in 
hardship to the plaintiff. See id. at 362. 
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In this case, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court to re-
quire the Defendants to perform under an oral agreement (the 
Lease Option). As applied to this case, Stanqle instructs that 
this Court cannot disregard the statute of frauds, even though 
it appears that the Plaintiffs may suffer some hardship as a re-
sult of such judgment. If this Court were to to accept the 
Plaintiffs' estoppel argument, 
parties to a contract negotiation could not rely on the 
protections afforded by the statute of frauds, thereby 
eviscerating it. Moreover, contract negotiators would never 
know at what point mere negotiations became a binding con-
tract. Parties to contract negotiations should be entitled 
to rely on the statute of frauds absent a clear manifesta-
tion of intent to claim no reliance. A party concerned 
about the assertion of the statute of frauds could easily 
protect itself by demanding written commitments before act-
ing in reliance on the negotiations. 
id. at 365. 
The Court finds that Stanqle controls in this case. At no 
time did the Defendants' conduct "clearly manifest an intention 
that [they] would not assert the statute of frauds." Ld. Re-
gardless of the fact that no written lease was ever memorial-
ized, and the fact that both parties had apparently abandoned 
the REPC sometime in September 2004, the Plaintiffs gambled that 
the Lease Option negotiations would be successfully concluded. 
Even if this Court found that the Defendants assured the Plain-
tiffs that they would enter into the Lease Option with the 
Plaintiffs, "a mere promise to execute a written contract and a 
subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create an estop-
pel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage is 
sustained as a consequence of the refusal." I_d. To be clear, 
promissory estoppel bars a defendant from asserting the statute 
of frauds as a defense only where the party has clearly and une-
quivocally represented that it would not use it as a defense. 
See id. at 365-66. Accordingly, because the Defendants did not 
represent that they would not assert the statute of frauds as a 
defense, the Defendants are not estopped from doing so. This 
holds true even though the Defendants refused to enter into the 
Lease Option, which they had negotiated in lieu of the REPC. 
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Because the Defendants are not barred from asserting the statute 
of frauds as a defense, and because the Lease Option was within 
the statute of frauds, the same is void because it was not in 
writing. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2005). 
II. FRAUD 
To establish fraud under Utah law, the plaintiff must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence each of the following elements: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a pres-
ently existing material fact (3) which was false, (4)which 
the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, 
(7) did in fact rely upon the representation, and (8) was 
thereby induced to act upon it, (9) to his injury and dam-
age . 
See Franco v. the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
2001 UT 25, 533. In addition, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
require that all averments of fraud be stated with particular-
ity. URCP Rule 9(a)(3); see also Wright and Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1297, at 590 (1990). 
First, the Plaintiffs have made general allegations of 
fraud. Plaintiffs have claimed that the "Defendants misled the 
Plaintiffs into believing that the Defendants preferred a lease 
option," knowing that if they could delay closing on the prop-
erty under the REPC, Plaintiffs would default and the Defendants 
could then accept a more lucrative offer from another party. 
See "Second Amended Complaint," pg. A (permission to amend 
granted at oral argument on December 19, 2005). These allega-
tions of fraud are insufficient under Rule 9 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as they do not possess the requisite par-
ticularity required by statute. 
The Plaintiffs also allege specific instances of fraud, but 
only regarding events which transpired after the October 24, 
2004 REPC closing deadline. These specific instances of alleged 
fraud involved a "fabricated" realtor commission, which the 
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Plaintiffs argue was fabricated by Defendants to avoid having 
the Plaintiffs demand closing on the REPC. See "Plaintiffs' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, at pg. 12 (filed November 01, 
2005). Under Utah law, to be fraudulent, a representation must 
concern a "presently existing material fact." See Franco, 2001 
UT 25, 3133. After October 24, 2004, any fraudulent representa-
tions allegedly made by the Defendants would be immaterial to 
the REPC, since its closing date had already passed and the par-
ties had not agreed, in writing, to an extension of any of the 
deadlines specified in the REPC. 
Second, "fraud, generally, cannot be predicated upon the 
failure to perform a promise or contract which is unenforceable 
under the statute of frauds, for the promissor has not, in a le-
gal sense, made a contract; and therefore, he has the right, 
both in law and equity, to refuse to perform." Stanqle, 948 
P.2d at 362. This means that any claim of fraud predicated upon 
the Lease Option, or representations made regarding the Lease 
Option, are insufficient as a matter of law, because the Lease 
Option is void under the statute of frauds. 
Additionally, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs have ar-
gued that, as part of the Lease Option negotiations, Defendant 
James Farnsworth "made suggestions to modify the Lease Option 
Agreement." See "Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judg-
ment," at pg. 8 (filed November 01, 2005). The Plaintiffs indi-
cate that these modifications were suggested on October 9, 2004. 
Id. Plaintiffs argue that 
the only logical explanation is that Jim was acting in good 
faith to bring about the terms of the Lease Option to a 
fair and final agreement. Unless Jim had a bona fide in-
tention to pursue the Lease Option, there would have been 
no reason to suggest a change in a term which would bene-
fit the Eldridges. 
Id. The Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways, arguing in one 
breath that negotiating the Lease Option was a ploy to avoid a 
demand for performance of the REPC AND that the Defendants were 
sincere in their desire to find Lease Option terms which would 
be amenable to both parties. Such arguments appear to this 
Court to be diametrically opposed; either the Defendants were 
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negotiating the Lease Option fraudulently or they were negotiat-
ing with good faith. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds 
that the Plaintiffs fraud claims are insufficient as a matter of 
law. 
III. WAIVER 
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit 
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). In this case, both par-
ties had rights against the other party by virtue of the REPC. 
Those rights are independent of the proposed Lease Option which 
never materialized and never provided any rights to the Plain-
tiffs or the Defendants. 
The Plaintiffs acknowledge that "the Defendants had a right 
to rely on the REPC." "Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment," pg. 15. The Plaintiffs also acknowledge that "when 
the parties agreed to proceed with the Lease Option, they waived 
their right to proceed with the REPC...they relinquished their 
right to the REPC..." Id. The Court is of the opinion that 
both parties abandoned the REPC sometime in September 2004. In 
doing so, both parties would have intentionally relinquished 
known rights under the REPC. Regardless, the fact that the par-
ties had waived rights under the REPC does not in any way make 
the Lease Option a binding agreement between these parties. The 
fact of the matter is that even if the Defendants intentionally 
relinquished all of their rights under the REPC, the Lease Op-
tion was never memorialized in writing and signed by the Defen-
dants. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' waiver argument is also in-
sufficient as a matter of law. 
ORDER 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Additionally, even though the 
Court has not received a request for a decision on the Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, that motion is hereby DE-
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NIED. This is a direct result of granting the Defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment and is done now in an effort to re-
solve the matter and to ensure consistent rulings in this mat-
ter. 
Dated this f/^^day of 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
| CASE NO. 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: 
1) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Reconsider," filed with the Court an 
January 30, 2006; 2) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Extend the Time to 
Appeal/' filed with the Court on February 14, 2006; 3) Plain-
tiffs' "Objections to the Order Submitted by Defendants Without 
Notice or Motion Dated January 12, 2006," filed with the Court 
on January 18, 2006; and 4) Defendants' "Motion to Award Fees 
and Costs," filed with the Court on January 18, 2006. The Court 
has reviewed these motions and the memoranda in support of, and 
in opposition to, each respective motion. The Court has also 
reviewed the Plaintiffs' objections to the-Defendants' proposed 
order. Having received notice to submit these motions for deci-
sion, and being informed in the matter, the Court will now ad-
dress each of the motions and the objections in turn. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
While the Court does have discretion in determining whether 
to reconsider an order so long as no final judgment has entered, 
see Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 518 (cit-
ing U.P.C., Inc. v. R.Q.C. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 9155; 
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Utah R. C iv . P. 54 ( b ) ) , t he Utah Supreme Court has p o i n t e d ou t 
t h a t such mot ions a r e not r e c o g n i z e d by t h e r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e 
in c i v i l c a s e s and has d i s c o u r a g e d t h e f i l i n g of such m o t i o n s . 
The Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure do not recognize motions 
to r econs ide r . Although we have discouraged these motions, 
they have p ro l i f e r a t ed in c i v i l ac t ions to the ex ten t t h a t 
they have become the cheatgrass of the l i t i g a t i o n land-
scape. We acknowledge t h a t the ext raordinary circumstance 
may a r i s e when i t i s appropr ia te to request a t r i a l cour t 
to recons ider a ru l ing . These occasions are r a r e , however, 
and we encourage a t to rneys to reverse the t rend to make mo-
t i o n s to reconsider rou t ine . 
Shipman v , Evans , 2004 UT 44, 518 n . 5 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . The 
Utah Supreme Court no t e s t h a t t h e r e a r e , on r a r e o c c a s i o n , e x -
t r a o r d i n a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s w a r r a n t i n g a r e q u e s t f o r a t r i a l c o u r t 
t o r e c o n s i d e r a r u l i n g . However, t h e Court cannot s e e , and t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s have f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t , any r ea son as t o why t h e s e 
p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e e x t r a o r d i n a r y such t h a t t h e i r mo-
t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r should be g r a n t e d . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s Cour t 
w i l l no t e n t e r t a i n t h e P l a i n t i f f s ' mot ion t o r e c o n s i d e r as i t 
r e l a t e s t o any i s s u e a l r e a d y e x p l i c i t l y add re s sed by t h e Cour t 
i n i t s J a n u a r y 11 , 2006 r u l i n g . 
In t h a t r u l i n g , t h e Court a d d r e s s e d each cause of a c t i o n 
i d e n t i f i e d i n P l a i n t i f f s ' >sSecond Amended C o m p l a i n t , " 1 The Court 
g r a n t e d P l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o f i l e t h e amended compla in t a t o r a l 
argument on December 19, 2005, and s i g n e d an o r d e r on t h a t mo-
t i o n J a n u a r y 1 1 , 2006. "Once a p a r t y has amended a p l e a d i n g , 
t h e amended p l e a d i n g s u p e r s e d e s t h a o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g , and t h e 
o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g performs no f u n c t i o n in t h e c a s e . " Campbell 
v, Debry, 2001 UT App 397, 517 n .4 ( c i t i n g 6 F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e & 
The Plaint i f fs second amended complaint also sought "alternate recovery," 
arguing that i t would be "unconscionable for th© Defendants to profit from 
their intentional deceit. ' ' Id. at pg. 6. The Court did not expl ici t ly ad-
dress th i s in i t s January 11, 2006 ruling. However, a review of the record 
shows nothing material upon which to make a finding of intentional deceit on 
the part of the Defendants. The Court has already ruled that , as a matter of 
law, the P la in t i f f s ' fraud claims fa i l . By doing so, the Court intended to 
include in that ruling the Plaint i f fs ' claims for "intentional decei t ." Fur-
ther, a review of the record indicates that the Plaintiffs have failed to ar-
gue anything in support of their claim for alternate recovery. 
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Procedure, Wright, Miller & Kane § 1476 (1990); see also Moore's 
Federal Practice, Civil § 15.17 (3) ("An amended pleading that is 
complete in itself and does not reference or adopt any portion 
of the prior pleading supersede$ the prior pleading.")). There-
fore, any cause of action contained in the original complaint or 
the first amended complaint, but not contained in the Second 
Amended Complaint, "performs no function in the case." Camp-
bell, 2001 UT App 397, 517 n.4. 
Having addressed each of the causes of action in the second 
amended complaint explicitly, the Court will not revisit them in 
any detail. In addition to the issues explicitly ruled upon by 
the Court, there are also certain issues raised by the Plain-
tiffs in their motion to reconsider which, as a result of grant-
ing Defendants7 motion for summary judgment, have been implic-
itly ruled upon by the Court. In order to bring clarity to 
those issues, the Court will briefly explicate for the benefit 
of the complaining party. 
The Plaintiffs' argue that the Court's January 11, 2006 
ruling "summarily dismissed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment without explanation." See Plaintiffs' "Memorandum in 
Support of Their Motion to Reconsider," pg. 2 (filed January 30, 
2006). The Plaintiffs argue that they are 
entitled to an explanation of the Court's reasons for deny-
ing their motion, including each issus addressed by the 
Plaintiffs,, not raised in the Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, including Plaintiffs' motion for specific 
performance; [sic] and Plaintiffs' motion to deny Defen-
dants' request to find the lis pendens a wrongful lien. 
Id, The Court will discuss damages, specific performance, and 
the lis pendens. 
Before discussing damages and specific performance indi-
vidually, the Court wishes to raise the following general point 
as it relates to both damages and specific performance. The 
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
[n] either party to an agreement can be said to be in de-
fault (and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a 
decree far specific performance) until the other party has 
3 of a 
tendered his own performance. In other words, a party must 
make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put 
the other party in default. 
Kelley v. Leudacia Financial Corp., 846 P,2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 
1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because 
there is no indication that either of the parties tendered their 
own agreed performance under the REPC, neither the Plaintiffs or 
the Defendants are in a position to compel specific performance 
or recover damages. The Court is persuaded by the Defendants' 
argument on this point. See Defendants' "Memorandum in Opposi-
tion to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider," pg. 4 thru 11 (filed 
February 10, 2006). 
A. DAMAGES 
In the Plaintiffs7 second amended complaint, they seek 
"reasonable compensation for the damages, actual, consequential, 
and incidental, sustained by Plaintiffs'' and "punitive damages," 
Plaintiffs' "Second Amended Complaint," pg. 7. The Court, in 
its January 11, 2006 ruling, already ruled upon the Plaintiffs' 
estoppel, fraud and waiver claims. Therefore, because those are 
the only causes of action pled by the second amended complaint, 
there remains nothing upon which the Court could base an award 
of damages. 
In their original complaint, the Plaintiffs did plead 
breach of contract. However, as already noted, the later 
amended pleadings superseded the original complaint. Because 
the latest amended pleading did not include any action for 
breach of contract, nor did it incorporate any reference to the 
earlier complaints, that cause of action was deemed by this 
Court to have been abandoned. Further, it would be incongruous 
to grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment (which ad-
dressed all claims upon which an award of damages could be 
based) and then award damages to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, by 
granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court 
had implicitly denied the Plaintiffs an award of damages, and, 
for the sake of perfect clarity, explicitly denies Plaintiffs 
request for damages at this time. 
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B. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
As the Court noted in its January 11, 2006 ruling, the REPC 
was an enforceable agreement and satisfied the statute of 
frauds. However, sometime in the middle of September 2004, the 
parties abandoned that agreement. Neither party performed their 
obligations under the REPC. Therefore, due to non-performance, 
the parties waived their rights under that contract. 
The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to specific 
performance on this contract, invoking either equitable specific 
performance or specific performance as outlined in the REPC* 
The Court has already addressed both of these arguments in its 
January 11, 2006 ruling, but will briefly re-visit the issue. 
First, the REPC, which created a contractual right to specific 
performance, was abandoned by the parties. Therefore, it cannot 
serve as a basis upon which this Court can grant specific per-
formance. Second, because neither of the parties performed un-
der the REPC, neither are in a position to seek equitable reme-
dies. Therefore, equitable specific performance is not an op-
tion. Finally, the Lease Option was never memorialized in writ-
ing as required by law. Therefore, it cannot be specifically 
enforced. As this Court views the situation, there is no avenue 
by which to grant specific performance in this case. 
It is appropriate at this point to clarify a point made by 
the Court in its January 11, 2006 ruling. In discussing spe-
cific performance, the Court stated, "...the parties are free to 
sue each other for defaulting under the REPC..." Ruling, pg. 
3. In making this statement, the Court was contemplating a 
separate lawsuit for breach of contract. Indeed, as already 
stated, the original complaint in this action included a claim 
for breach of contract. That claim, again as already stated, 
was not included in later amended pleadings, therefore it was 
deemed by the Court to have been abandoned. The Plaintiffs have 
indicated that *[t]his court recognized the issue in its judg-
ment on the motions for summary judgment in stating this issue 
was preserved for trial." See Plaintiffs' Objections to Defen-
dants' Reply Memorandum, filed February 14, 2006 pg.l. The 
Plaintiffs misunderstand the Court's ruling. To be clear, the 
breach action was not included in the second amended complaint. 
Therefore, when the Court said the parties were free to sue each 
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other for breach, that contemplated a separate action for breach 
of contract. The Court did not, at any time, state that the is-
sue was preserved for trial. 
C. THE LIS PENDENS 
The lis pendens is the primary subject of the Plaintiffs' 
objections to the Defendants' proposed order which followed the 
Courts' January 11, 2006 ruling. The Plaintiffs have pointed 
out that the Court did not address the lis pendens in its Janu-
ary 11, 2006 ruling. The Court concedes this point and recog-
nizes the need to rule upon this issue in order to conclude the 
matter. 
The Defendants have argued that the lis pendens constitutes 
a wrongful lien. The Defendants argue that the lis pendens has 
been wrongful from the date on which the Court made findings and 
dissolved the TRO in this matter. The Court reminds the Defen-
dants that at the hearing on November 29, 2004, the Court was 
specifically addressing the case in light of the TRO which had 
been entered. The Court was not addressing the merits of the 
underlying causes of action at that time. 
Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the lis pendens 
has not, at any time in this matter, been wrongful. The fact of 
the matter is that litigation has been pending during the entire 
time that the lis pendens has been in place. The lis pendens 
"charges the public with notice of outstanding claims and causes 
one who deals with property involved in pending litigation to do 
so at his peril." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1979) . The Court believes that the lis pendens has 
been lawfully in place, notifying the public of pending litiga-
tion. Therefore, the Court will not order the removal of the 
lis pendens. Similarly, the Court will not award the Defendants 
any damages, costs or fees as they relate to the lis pendens. 
The Court also reminds the parties that the lis pendens can 
lawfully remain in place after this Court issues final judgment 
in the matter, pending any forthcoming appeal. See Hidden Mead-
ows, 590 P,2d at 1248. 
6 of a 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO APPEAL 
Upon review of this motion, the Court is convinced that 
this motion is unnecessary at this time, as a final judgment has 
not yet issued. Even though the Court's January 11, 2006 ruling 
was caption "Ruling and Order" and contained a paragraph titled 
"Order," neither of the parties have treated that as a final 
judgment. The Defendants' submitted a proposed order to the 
Court, which, as of yet, the Court has not signed. Submitting 
this proposed order to the Court indicates to the Court that the 
Defendants did not view the Court's ruling as a final order in 
the matter. Therefore, the Court finds that no final judgment 
has entered and therefore the Plaintiffs' time to appeal has not 
yet begun to expire. As a result, because this issue is not 
ripe for decision, the Court will dismiss the motion. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AWARD FEES AND COSTS 
As Defendants have correctly stated, attorney fees are only 
awarded if permitted by statute or contract. No statute awards 
attorney fees in a matter such as this, except for the portion 
of this matter involving the TRO and the lis pendens. The Court 
is of the opinion that the Defendants should be awarded the fees 
incurred in defending against the TRO. As for the lis pendens, 
fees are only recoverable in the event that the lis pendens was 
wrongful. The Court has ruled that the lis pendens was not 
wrongful, therefore there can be no recovery under that statute. 
Having addressed the relevant statutes, the Court now turns 
to the contract between the parties. The REPC specifically ad-
dresses attorney fees. While this was, at one time, an enforce-
able contract between these parties, that contract cannot serve 
as a basis for the award of fees in this matter. The Court has 
found that the parties abandoned the REPC and relinquished their 
rights thereunder. Indeed, it is for this reason, in large 
part, that the Court granted the Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. It would be incongruous to say that the parties aban-
doned the REPC, but the Defendants can recover their fees under 
that same contract. 
Therefore, no attorney fees will be awarded to the Defen-
dants other than those fees incurred as a result of the TRO. 
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Because the Court finds that the REPC had been abandoned by both 
parties sometime in September 2004, the provision of the REPC 
awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in the event of 
litigation to enforce the REPC is no longer enforceable. 
Finally, the Defendants, as the prevailing party in this 
matter, will be awarded their costs of suit. 
ORDER 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that Plaintiffs' motion to 
reconsider is DENIED (noting that the Court finds no basis for 
an award of damages or specific performance for the Plaintiffs); 
that Plaintiffs' motion to extend time for appeal is DISMISSED 
as not ripe for decision; that the Defendants' motion for fees 
and costs is GRANTED IN PART, but only as to 1) the recovery of 
attorney fees for the portion of this case involving the TRO and 
2) an award of their costs of suit as the prevailing party; and 
that the lis pendens is not wrongful and should not be removed 
during the pendency of this litigation, including during any 
pending appeal. 
Dated this /\P\ day of ^(jfsjA^ , 2006. 
BY THE COOTfT: ) 
!N R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TY ELDR1DGE and MARTINA ELDRIDGE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH, 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
ORDER 
Case No. 04080079 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The above-captloned matter came before the Court, pursuant to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed on August 26, 
2005. The Plaintiffs also liled a Cross Motion for Sumnary Judgment. 
The parties submitted memoranda on the motions and the Court heard oral 
argument on December 19, 2005. The Court then entered its Ruling and 
Order on January 11, 2006. The Court's Ruling and Order grants the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denies the Plaintiffs' Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgement. The Plaintiff then filed a motion to 
n ""insidpr, and a motion tn p*tend time to apppa], whil^ PP f -nd.j n t o 
filed a motion for fees and costs The Court entered its PJIL^Q rind 
Order on those motions on March 29, 2006 
Based on those Rulings and Orders and the findings and reasons set 
forth therein, the Court hereby Orders that: 
1. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (which the Court allowed 
to be filed at the December 19, 2005 hearing) is dismissed with 
prej udice. 
2. Plaintiffs' motion seeking additional time to appeal is 
dismissed as it was filed prematurely. 
3. Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider is denied. 
4. Defendants' Counterclaim alleging an unlawful lis pendens is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
5. Defendants are awarded the fees incurred on that portion of 
the case involving the TRO. Defendants are also awarded their costs. An 
affidavit setting forth the fees incurred shall be filed with the Court 
and the Plaintiffs shall have ten days from the mailing of the affidavit 
to file an objection as to the reasonableness of the fees. If there is 
an objection the Court will hold a hearing on the reasonableness of the 
fees . 




IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 04 08C0079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs'"Motion tc 
Conform the Complaint to the Evidence," tiled with the Court on 
March 14, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum and a 
propose:) "Third Amended Complaint." The Defendants filed an op-
position memorandum on March 24, 2006. The Plaintiffs filed a 
response to the Defendants' opposition or. April 05, 2C06. On 
that same day, the Court received a notice tc submit tne motion 
for decision. Having reviewed the motion and related memoranda, 
the Court now rules upon the motion. 
The motion seeks for a court order amending (for a third 
time) the Plaintiffs' complaint to include a multitude of issues 
as identified by the motion, including; 1) specific performance; 
2) damages; 3) attorney fees / costs; 4) breach of contract; 5) 
fraud; 6) waiver; 7} promissory estoppel; 8) punitive damages; 
9) covenant of good fai-h and fair dealing; and 10) intentional 
/ negligent misrepresentation. Before addressing the merits of 
the Plaintiffs' motion, the Court points out that previous rul-
ings have already explicitly addressed each and every issue 
identified by the Plaintiffs' motion, excepL for tne issues of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and intentional / 
negligent misrepresentation. 
The Plaintiffs, in making their motion, rely on Sules 8(f) 
and 15(c) of the Utan Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3(f) 
states, VA11 pleadings shall be so construed as 10 do substan-
tial justice." The Court recognizes that pleadings are to be 
construed as to do substantial justice. However, in this case, 
the issue is not construing a pleading (i.e., the second amended 
complaint, as the operative pleading), but rather the issue is 
whether to allow amendment to a pleading for a third tine, after 
summary judgment for the opposing party heis issued, to include 
new causes of action not included in previous pleadings, for 
that reason, the Court finds that Rule 8(f) is inapposite to the 
motion, before the Coum, 
Unlike Rule 8(f), Rule 15(b) is arguably relevant to tne 
motion before the Court. Rule 15(b) states, 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by ex-
press or implied consent of the parties, tney shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such ame.ndner.ts of the pleadings as may be nec-
essary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend dees 
not affect the result of the trial ot these issues. If 
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it 
is not within the issues made by tho pleadings, the court 
may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation 
of the mer.its of the action will be subserved thereby and 
the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the ad-
mission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his act j on or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting 
party tc meet such evidence*, 
The Court finds that case law Interpreting Rule .1.5(b) as it per-
tains to lawsuits disposed of at the summary judgment phase is 
scant. The plain reading of the rule suggests to this Court, as 
has been held in other jurisdictions, that Rule 15(b) applies 
only where the case has proceeded to actual trial, .5ej3 Crawfcrd 
v. Gould, 56 F.lci 2162 (9th Cir. 1995); plue Cross Blue Shield 
of Ala, v. Weitz, 913 £\2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1990). The rule it-
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self employs the words "tried" and "tne trial." The language of 
the rule and the persuasive authority from other jurisdictions 
lends credence to the proposition that Rule 15 ;b) is cr.ly impli-
cated when the case proceeds LO trial. This motion would be 
easily resolved in favor of the Defendants if the Court were to 
find Rule 15(b) net applicable to cases decided on summary judg-
ment. That said, the parties have identified Hall Strom v. 3uh-
jLer, 378 P.2d 355 {Utah 1963), which applies Rule 15(b) to a 
case decided on summary judgment, but thai: esse does not explic-
itly address Rule 15{b)'s applicability to cases decided on sum-
mary judgment. fc'or purposes of this ruling, and against reser-
vations to the contrary, the Court will assume that Rule 15(b) 
does apply in cases decided on summary judgment, thus giving the 
Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt. Even making such an as-
sumption, the Court is not convinced that the rule requires the 
Court to allow the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint' for a 
third time. 
Tne Court, finds chut ths Defendants havu repeatedly ob-
jected to Plaintiffs' submission of matters outside of the 
pleadings for the Court's consideration. See Defendants' "Mem. 
:.r, Opp. to Plaintiffs' Xotion to Reconsider," -at 11 (objecting 
to covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Defendants' N'Repiy 
Mom. in Supp. of Motion for Summary Judgment," at 7 (objecting 
to misrepresentation); Defendants' "Reply Mem. in Supp. of De-
fendants' Motion to Award Fees and Costs," at 1 (objecting to 
breach of contract). Having objected to the issues, the Court 
capnct find that the issues were tried oy the express or implied 
consent of the parties, and therefore the Court is not required 
to allow amendment of the complaint. Rsthor, these issues, be-
ing specifically objected to, implicate the third sentence of 
Rule 15(b). See fibre Trust, 1 nc. v. Brahman-fin., 974 P.2d 
288, 291 (Utah 1999). Under that part of the rule, allowing the 
Plaintiffs to amend the complaint is subject, to the discretion 
of the trial court. The Court "may" allow the pleading to be 
amended if: 1) presentation of the Terics of the action are 
thereby subserved and 2) if the objecting party fails zo satisfy 
the Court ~hat the admission of such evidence woulc bo prejudi-
cial to the objecting party. 
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In this case, the Court finds that neither requirement is 
met. First, allowing the Plaintiff to amend "he complaint will 
not facilitate presentation en the merits, which have already 
been fully adjudicated at this late point by the entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of Lhc: Defendants. Second, the Defen-
dants: have satisfied the Court that prejudice would result if 
the Court were to allow the Plaintiffs to amend, the complaint 
for a third time and after summary juagrcent has entered. 
The Plaintiffs have offered this Court no explanation as to 
why thesa new claims were not included in the First Amended Com-
plaint or in the Second Amended ComplainL. Twice the Plaintiffs 
have amended their complaint (cnc;e by rignt and once by permis-
sion of the Court) and, having issued final judgment on the 
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs now seek to shift to new theo-
ries hoping that one such theory will ioac the Court to find in 
their favor. In the opinion of this Court, that is not the pur-
pose of any of the rules reliec upon by the Plaintiffs in their 
motion tc conform. The parties have prepared the case, includ-
ing conducting discovery and arguing motions, based upon the 
first anc second amended complaints. At this late time in the 
case, it would be clearly prejudicial to the Defendants to allow 
the Plaintiffs once again to amend their complaint. The Defen-
dants have not prepared theli case with these new causes of ac-
tion in mind, but have uiiigently objected to tne introduction 
of issues outside of the pleadings. To allow t.ne Plaintiffs to 
continually refine their strategy, both after summary judgment 
motions were filed ans after judgment was entered on such mo-
tions, would work an injustice on. the Defencants, Therefore, 
the Court will deny the Plaintiffs' motion to conform. 
Finally, having addressed the only two new causes of action 
contained in the proposed third amended complaint, the Court 
wishes to once again briefly address r.he issue of breach of con-
tract, In the January 11, 2006 ruling, this Court, in discuss-
ing specific psrformar.ee, stated that "While the parties are 
free to sue each ether for defaulting under the REPC, seeking 
specific performance (an equitable remedy) requires *ciean 
hands,' which, due to non-performance, neither of the parties 
possesses under the REPC." January 11, 2006 Ruling, at pg. 3. 
?he Plaintiffs understood this to mean that the issue of breach 
A C f '.; 
of concract was reserved for trial. To clarify Che Court's po-
sition or: thxs issue, the Court, in the Maich 29, 2006 ruling, 
stated that "In making [the statement aoove], the Court was con-
templating a separate lawsuit Cor breacn of cortract" because 
thp Court believed chat the Plaintiffs, by not including the 
original breacn of contract claim in either of the amended COT-
piamts, had abandoned that particular cause of action. Upon 
further reflection, this Court is of the opinion that a separate 
lawsuit on breach of contract would be unavailing to either 
party for, in large part, the vcr.y reason that th~s Court 
cranted the Defendants' motion for summary 'judgment. The Court 
has found that the parties abandoned Lho 35 PC sometime .in Sep-
tember ?C04 and tnat both parties waived the rigrts that were 
enforceable by vrtue of that agreement. Therefore, the Court 
was wrong when it stated that the parties were free to sue each 
other for defaulting under the REPC. That agreement, abandoned 
by both parties, became unenforceable and neither party can pur-
sue an action for breach of that contract. 
Tnerefore, based upon the foregoing, the Plaintiffs' "Mo-
tion to Conform che Complaint to the Evidence" is DENiSD. 
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JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH, 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' "Motion to 
Release Lis Pendens," filed April 25, 2006, and accompanied by 
supporting memorandum. The Plaintiffs filed an objection to the 
motion on May 04, 2006. The Defendants' reply memorandum in 
support was filed May 12, 2006. On July 18, 2006, the Court re-
ceived a notice to submit the motion for decision. The Court 
has reviewed the motion, the related memoranda, and the prior 
rulings in this case, and, having received a request for deci-
sion, now rules upon the motion. For the reasons that follow, 
the Court will grant the motion in part. 
The Defendants argue that the lis pendens should be re-
leased pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-4 0-2.5(3), which reads: 
(3) A court shall order a notice released if: (a) the court 
receives a motion to release under Subsection (2) ; and (b) 
the court finds that the claimant has not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the 
real property claim that is the subject of the notice. 
The Court first notes that while it has addressed the lis pen-
dens in other rulings related to this case, this is the first 
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time a motion for release has been filed. The Court has ruled 
that the lis pendens did not constitute a wrongful lien and has 
cited to Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1979) to support the proposition that the lis pendens could stay 
in place pending the Plaintiffs' appeal. See "Ruling and Or-
der," p. 6 (filed March 29, 2006). In the March 29 ruling, the 
Court stated that "the Court will not order removal of the lis 
pendens." I_d. The Court further ordered that "the lis pendens 
is not wrongful and should not be removed during the pendency of 
this litigation, including during any pending appeal." id. at 
8. In taking that position on the issue of the lis pendens, the 
Court was considering it in the context of finding the lis pen-
dens to not be wrongful. In other words, the Court's refusal to 
order the release of the lis pendens was due to the Court's 
finding that the lis pendens was not wrongful and could there-
fore lawfully remain in place. 
The Defendants' motion to release presents the Court with a 
new issue to consider. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-2.5(3), it would appear that the Court has no choice but 
to release the lis pendens at this time. The statute requires 
(1) a motion to be filed and (2) a finding by the Court that the 
"claimant" (as defined by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-2.5(1) (a)) has not established the probable validity of 
the underlying real property claim. Both of these criteria are 
met at this time. The Defendants have filed a motion, satisfy-
ing the first requirement. Furthermore, the Court has granted 
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, indicating that the 
Plaintiffs' have failed to establish probability of validity of 
the underlying property claim by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, satisfying the second requirement. 
The Plaintiffs argue that, should the Court decide to leave 
the lis pendens in place, the Court may require a "guarantee" 
(as defined by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-2.5(1)(b)) as a condition of maintaining the notice. As 
the Court reads the statute, and as previously stated, the Court 
does not have a choice as to whether to leave the lis pendens in 
place once the requirements of § 78-40-2.5(3) are met. The 
Court does not construe the statute to allow the Court to ignore 
the mandatory "shall" language of § 78-40-2.5(3) by requiring a 
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guarantee under § 78-40-2.5(5). Rather, the Court interprets 
the plain language of the statute to indicate that a guarantee 
is always an option when a notice of lis pendens is in place, 
whether or not a motion to release the notice has been filed. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5(5)(b). The fact that the Court, 
in its discretion, may order a guarantee as a condition of main-
taining the notice does not give the Court latitude to ignore 
clear direction from the Utah Legislature. "Shall" is manda-
tory, and the Court will abide by the requirements of the law as 
outlined in § 78-40-2.5(3). It is for this reason that the 
Court will grant the Defendants' motion to release. 
In addition to the motion to release, the Defendants have 
also requested costs and attorney fees as they relate to this 
motion, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5(7). That statute 
requires the Court to award such costs and fees "unless the 
court finds that: (a) the nonprevailing party acted with sub-
stantial justification;...." In this case, the Court finds that 
the Plaintiffs, in filing the lis pendens, acted with substan-
tial justification. At the time the lis pendens was filed, the 
Plaintiffs honestly believed that they had rights to the under-
lying property based upon theories of contract and estoppel. 
The Court does not believe that the Plaintiffs filed suit merely 
to harass or unjustifiably cloud title to the property. The 
fact that the Plaintiffs' claims have ultimately been adjudi-
cated by this Court as non-meritorious in no way diminishes the 
substantial justification the Plaintiffs had when filing the no-
tice of lis pendens. The Court will therefore not award costs 
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ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART: 1) the notice of lis 
pendens is ordered to be released forthwith and 2) the Defen-
dants request for costs and fees on the motion is DENIED. 
Dated this \(r day of ftuCiUSf 
BY THE COURT: 
2006. 
JOHN R. ANDE 
By. 
'^y^l'CT ~"6oUR-T' JUDGE 
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JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
CASE NO. 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: 
1) Plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Appeal, filed July 28, 
2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum; and (2) Plain-
tiffs' Motion'for Stay of Execution of the Court's Orders and 
for Approval of the Bond, filed August 23, 2006, and accompanied 
by supporting memorandum. The Defendants did not respond to the 
Motion to File an Amended Appeal, and the Plaintiffs submitted a 
notice to submit on August 23, 2006. : The Defendants filed a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion to stay on September 01, 
2006. The Plaintiffs' reply memorandum in-support was filed 
September 20, 2006. The Court received a notice to submit the 
motion to stay on September 26, 2006. Having reviewed the mo-
tions and related memoranda, and having received a notice to 
submit each motion for decision, the Court now rules upon the 
motions. 
I. MOTION TO FILE AMENDED APPEAL: 
1
 The Court was not made aware that this motion was still pending until re-
cently. The Court apologizes for Lhe delay in ru.l \ ng upon this motion. 
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The Court's review of the law does not indicate that any 
such motion exists. Further, even assuming such a motion is ap-
propriate, this is not the correct Court to which to address the 
motion. Jurisdiction over any appeal in this matter is properly 
vested in the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This Court lacks the authority to determine what issues will be 
entertained by the appellate court on appeal. Therefore, the 
Court will dismiss the motjon. 
II. MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF THE COURT'S ORDERS AND E'OR 
APPROVAL OF THE BOND: 
Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in 
part, 
When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a su-
persedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay 
is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. The 
bond may be given at or after the time of filing the 
notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the su-
persedeas bond is approved by the court. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(d). The form of the supersedeas bond 
can be 
a personal bond having one or more sureties who are 
residents of Utah having a collective net worth of at 
least twice the amount of the bond, exclusive of prop-
erty exempt from execution. Sureties on personal bonds 
shall make and file an affidavit setting forth in rea-
sonable detail the assets and liabilities of the 
surety. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(i)(l). Further, 
[a] supersedeas bond given pursuant to Subdivision (d) 
shall provide that each surety submits to the juris-
diction of the court and irrevocably appoints the 
clerk of the court as the surety's agent upon whom any 
papers affecting the surety's liability on the bond 
may be served, and that the surety's liability may be 
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enforced on motion and upon such notice as the court 
may require without the necessity of an independent 
action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(i)(4). The Court, having reviewed the 
matter, finds that these requirements are met. The Plaintiffs 
have obtained a sufficient personal bond from Utah residents who 
have filed an affidavit setting forth reasonable detail as to 
their assets and liabilities. Further, the sureties have sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. While the Court can 
understand the Defendants' desire to have greater documentation 
of the assets and liabilities of the sureties, the requirements 
of the rule have been met. Therefore, the Court will approve 
the bond. Pursuant to Rule 62(d), r.he stay is now in effect; ana 
will encompass all orders of this Court, including the release 
of the lis pendens, which the Defendants did not object to. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the motion to amended is DISMISSED and the motion for stay 
and approval of the bond is GRANTED. The Court further orders 
the sureties in this matter, consistent with their affidavit, to 
take no action to lessen or deplete their assets during the pen-
dency of the appeal. Af f. David and Yvonne Kennison, 54. 
Dated this f<T day of ^ ^ ^ , 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 040800079 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail CLARK B ALLRED 
ATTORNEY DEF 
363 E MAIN ST STE 201 
VERNAL, UT 84078 
Mail ALVIN R LUNDGREN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
5015 W OLD HWY STE 200 
MT GREEN UT 84050 
Dated this ML dav ° f MQIUJIHW" , 2o_d£. 
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
•Hus fat a InUy binding contn*i_ Utah \xm nxjuin* ma! astrfs lic#io«*s to <eo *** form. Buy** and S«ilar, howwy-K, way sg#e* tu aH* or dmleto 
toprPtbk>«»crtou»#4dMfVM<foiiiL 3/ou dmmWtp. &• wadtice. cDnatjli|our«lcniey orUx*wi«K 
x .. r . EARN55T *ON£r PJECaPT _ 
described beky ate raefcy <fe«*iv9rs to tne ercken&fe as Carney Mcney. toe ancunc cf 5 J^L2 
s :c puroase the Property 
° ^ 0 ~~ in ?ne wm of 
& I be depcsitejjn; 
Received by" _ 
-dance whh stale law . < ^ * -
vtfiich. jpcn Acceptance of this crTei by at! parties ias defined in Secton 23). 
BroKerage: ^ 
3naixire at Agent/Broker acknowledge* receipt of Earnest Money) 
Friend M r^rjo^ i 
9/ * 
r- ^JJO'ovuY-.^ltl l l - O S 
OFFER TC3^  PURCHASE
 i ^PURCHASE
 f \ , • Q, -
„so«**cnnea-T U 1 H * M ^ F V^TSP frVsvVU 
Ciryof ao\cnw. Ccur.tycf V3w>V^ *•* V^-t. Slate cf Lssft Zip^'-WO /tr.e"Property*). 
1.1 Included Items. Unless exc!ucte<1 rarer., riirs sa:e indudei tfi* fsHcrvwinc ^ n s tf presently atTacred tc the Property: 
plumbing, heating, aif ccriritfcnng Sx&tf» etc equipment ceUsre ^r.s *si2--^E?ert &j»,t-m spc*rarce$: tontfixtures sr.2 
bulbs; bathroom futures; curtains, draperies snd ;*ccs; ^raftr* and doer screens: storrr. deers arcf wif!dcvfs: vwdew 3»nds; 
awnings; insisted television snteTra; sate^ne dishes and sys£tf. perrr-jn^y slfcxs£ ^ T i ^ : auxrnstcca'ace door opnr«er 
and ofxcmpanjring trsnsniitte.-'s); fenc^g; arc tr^ss and scrubs. The fefcewinc items shs!i also 5s r.ciLdted "r. this sale 2nd 
conveyed under separate Bill cf Sale with warranties as :c fcfc: . 
AJ2 Cxciuded iiatns. T h e f c ^ i ^ H e ^ s are -xciuded frcys this *ae £ > ^ ^ ^&<>i*VjrL*V^ A 3 ^ F g ~ ^ T 
\Z Water Rights. Tj)efoi^Jwir^gwsierng.^*saremeiv-decin!Msz^ ^">-° <-^-^^^« ^ \ J W A W C lak^k" 
£ y PVM g r ^ K ^ -> (HQ gXA-) 1 _ ' 
1.4 Survey. {CJieck appfccafcle boxes)* A survey [ \ WJLL J^ VWIUL NOT be prepared by s licensee 5Lrveycr. The 
Survey WorK vr?U be: [ J Prcper!y corners sfcsked \ ) Boundary* Survey [ ] Boii^ cary & Imorovements survey [ j Other 
(specify) . Reiponsfcifey for paymer.t'[ ] Buyer [ } Se3er [ ] =L»yer snd Sefler share equaHy. Buyers 
Dbli^ aticn tc parchaw und r^ thi^  Contract [ ] IS [ ] is NOT czftfXcn&d uccn Buyer's aporcva-' uf ihe 5ur.*y Wcrh. if yes 
the terms of the attached Sorvey Addendum apply. 
2. PURCHASE PWCE- The pL^hase Price fcr tite Prcpery is S J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H 
2.1 Method of Payment Trie Purchase Pnce will be paia as foUows. 
A - ^ 
s l ^ w 
s ^ ^ ^ d o ' 
(?) Esrnest Mornjy Deposit Under certain csnditscn** described tti >Jiis Contract, THF5 
DEP05.T i*AY BECOME TOTALLY NOH-REFUNDABLE. 
(t) NewLo^::. 3^yer sjp?es-o appv f"ra«r-A:£«.-: « ; . ^ -*.Cr-i> Sec^c-rlS. 3uyerwincpphf'cr 
one or more o? tnc- fo?»owir*g [cans, r ] COKVENTIONAL [ ] rrlA [ ] VA 
Jt^OTHER ispecfy} C^r*^PoT^yO A L ] 
If an fYirJVA lean applies, set actactvad FKAA/A L csri Addendum. 
If the ten is to iremeje any particular remis. then cne^ K be-low anc g.ve cecals' 
f J SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS 
Page * of (I pages 
(c) Loan Assumption (s*e attacne^ -«.^ .T.ptjc^ ACc-andLm if sccic2tAe\ 
(cO Seller r rnsneinrx ^>ee attached SefUrr -^.nanrzr-g Adceccurr. .f appiicaoie; 
(e) Other {specify) 
(!) Balance of Purchase FrtCe in Cash at Settlement 
PURCHASE FRiCtL Total of iinco (a) through (0 
/ / 
Date'"' Strlle^s I m t i a i ^ ^ y ^  - / - ^ /^tr 
Uc T" l=oai» 4r:i3 - R#at F^ f.me -°ur=lc»«^  C^ >f»trjo>. - G**n PiioLi.-ig. !r.c. n. . 3(h-i77-T 
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2J2 financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) M Buyers oWigsticn to fcurcfa** Te Prcparry IS conditioned uocn B^yef qualifying for .he applicable loanfs} 
referenced in SedJon 2.1(b» Cr (c) (the "Lo^n*} This ccp^u^n fe* referred tc as the Tmarcing Cond.bcn." 
(b) [ ] Buyer's obligation ts purchj« Section 2.3 
does not apply. 
2-3 Application for Loan. 
(a) Bayer's duties. No later than the Applicator. Deadline referencec m Secuor. 24{a). Buyer shall appiy fcr the 
Loan. "Loan Application* occurs only when Buyer has: «i) completed. &Qncdz and delivered to the lender (the 
"Lander) the amial tean application and documentation required by the Larder; a* ic (n) paid all Joan application fees 
as required cy the Lender Buyer agrtes tc dSgertty wonX tc obfatn the Lee:;. Buyerwi! promptly prcvice me Lender 
with anv additions) documentation as required by the Lencer. 
fb) Procedure if Loan Application is denied. JfSuver recces wr.ru^r^fra^ 
not approve the Lean {a 'Loan Denial*), Buyer snail, no iater than 2ir*e ca tena deys thefeaSer, provide a copy to 
Seller. Buysr cr Seilar may, wfchin three csier-da.- days af»r Seae^s nfCE;pi c; sjcr. notice, cancel this Ccntrect by 
provkSrswridenno6ce to the other oarty. in:teeventofacanc4p3L'r>ni^^ {IJrftha Loan Denial 
was received by Buyer on cr before the ^ M dsv of S+-s&. , : X C T ^ 7 the Earnest Money Deposit shall 
be returned to Buyer (a) if the Lean Denial ,was received by Bfcyersrter btet date. 3uyer agrees *c forfeit, and SeQer 
acress tc acceot as Seller's exc&sive remedy, the Earr.es: Monsy z* [[c'jidzt&d damages. A failure to cancel as 
provided in rhisSection 2.2/b) shaS have no effect on the ^na* tcirg Oz*\ctior. « * fcth n Sscocn 2-2(aK Cancellation 
pursuant to the previsions cf'any other section at this Ccn^act s.i^fi be governed Sy such tft*et provisions. 
1A AppraisaJ of Property. Buyers obligation to purchase ;h~ Property *ft \§J£& NOT conditioned u'pen the Property 
spcraising fcr not less than the Purchase Prtce. It the apcraisa? ccrscitjcr. appaesanc; ihe Prcpeny ^ praises for less than 
the Purchase Price, Buyer may cancel this Contract ay providing wniten recce to Seller no later thsn three calendar days 
attar Buyer's receipt of nctics of the appraised vaiue. In the event oi such cancelation, t^ -e Earnest Money Cepcsn shall 
b* released to Buyar. A faikim to cancel as proviced \t\ this Section 2.4 s^afl ce r^errec a waiver cf the appraisal 
condition by Buyer. 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Sefci€!T>ent shcil take place en The Se£err.entDeadline rafarer.ct9d n Sscfcn 24{d), cr 
on a dgfre upen which Buyer and Seller agree in w-ntxng. teSerJJe^ie:'r sr3il ccciir enly wher. ail of be rcBcwir.g have been 
completed: (a) Buyer and Setter have signed snc dallvarBd to each other cr *o the sscrow/desing office 31 documents 
required by this Contract by the Lender, by wn£en escrow Instructors or ty 
by Buyer under these documents (except lor the proceeds cf a^y new loan) have been de-r^ersd by Buyer tc Seller or to the 
escrow/tlcsing office in the form, of collected or deared tunds: and (c) any monlaE reoi^rad to be paid by Seller under tnese 
documents bSN^ baen defivered by Seller to Buyer cr to the escrovw/ciosins oTtce in the form of cotlecad cr dearec lcr.cz. 
Seta* and Buyer shall each pay crre-telf {M) cf the fee charged cv the escrc^/ebsbg office kx its services in the 
sentemerrtfcfcsing process. Taxes and assessment fix ±e curapt y^ar, rer-> s: anc inerest CTI assumed cbigarjens snail be 
prorated at Settlement as set forth in tn?s Ssct-jn Ts^ant depcerts i^ncfuding, btr. net iimited to. secinty deposits, desrmg 
deposits and prepaid rents) shal be paid or cratWed by Scderto Buyer ar Setfemer.L Proraticns ss forth in this SecSon sfrztL 
be made as of the Setaernent Dea&ne cais rWerenced :n Sacticr* 2^<d)^nJ«ss cth^rAise agreed to :n writlns by the partJes. 
Such-^htingcouldincsadethesettementst^ienient Tr»etiBrwactionvfciTl^(^i3ioer2Gc^^ 
compteted. and when aA of the fcflowina; have been cempteted: (i) tne orcceecb of any new loan have been defcvered by the 
Lander to Setter or "to the escrcwfcfcsinc office; and (5) the appficafcie Ctosmg documents r^ve been recorded in tr.e otTdce 
of the co«jn^ nscorder. The aliens descihsd ?n pgrta (?) ^ ^ ^
 c f rr^ r^erj&dT»3 ser.tsnce shall be cornoleted v*Tthin fcur 
calendar days of Settlement cv-f-> 
4. POSSESSION. Se»lar£r^fcelNerp^.ysic^!pc^sAssk;n;cBv.^ winr: f ] J hours [ ] f l W / c after Closinq-
C ] Other (specify) _, ' ^ ~ ^ 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At m^ sjgning or ;hi3 Contract 
[ ] Setter's Initials \ ] Buyer's mitwts 
The Ustinc Agent, ^ \ ^ S 'Stress [ ] Seller [ I B ^ r [ J both Buysr *nd Seller 
-r- \> •- A * \ ^ l OCX as a Limiled Agent; 
Tne Selung Agent >X W$ ^ repifes,-^ [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer r ] both Buyer and Seller 
The Listing Broker. \ \ \ \ M „ ^r
€
s^n!s [ ] Sa!Jer [ } Buyer [ ] b<^ B u ^ S d ^ l t e r 
T ^ ^ . i : ^ R^L,. , . \ V \ Y \ . » a limited Agent; 
Toe Se:l.nc B.ckcr A ^ 4 i i tews**:* { J SeJIer £ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer zndSeller 
as a Limited Agent 
Page 2 of 6 pages Seller's ^ i t » ^ i ^ O _ Date JWIOH Buyer's \mnMsjg£' Cste & / ^ 7 ^ f 
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S T1TUE INSURANCE. At Sette-nert. Scaler agrees * pay for a ^ r ^ r ^ v e r a c e cwnef s pchcy of WJe insurant insunnc 
3uyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. Ho l a w than ft, GeGer D « ' ^ ^ ! ^ ; ^ t ^ 2 r f : 2 ? " ^ * * " * * " * * * * 
(a> a Seller p i o ^ condition, dsciosufe fcr the Prop^y, signed and dated cy Sttter, 
(b) a commitmen: for the policy of ride insurance; 
}c( a oODY of any teases affecting the Prop*rr/ no; exp«nns prx* to closing 
(d) writer, notice of any claims and/cr c o r d o n s knewr to Seller reJ3t.no ic c*wiror.mental problems a-TC cuilomg cr 
zon.r.g code violate**: and 
(e) Other Wpedfy) _ J U £ t 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CAMCEL BASED OM EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Bjyer* oolicsiicn to purcr.ase under 
^ th i s Contract (check applicable boxes): , , - * ,
 c - l a r - : * ^ , ^ ^ ™ « H r Q-,-nr •»• 
rOQ IS fatfS NOT conditioned :^on goer 's approval o* ihe centers uf £;; r«a SsJar ^scfcsures rsffcienced m S^CDOT. , 
J * & 3 IS B t S NOT GoreBtonea uccn Bi.--*f s accnr.ai cf a phy s-cai ccr.d:i-cn :rspecr»cn of »he ^rcps*/; 
1 $ r [ l
 JS C T ^ N O T congitjonec 14500 Buyer's e>provai of trie fcilcwng u&± *c eva.uaaer.s cf ihs Prcpery {soec-fy) 
[Buyer's 
under Seclicn 11. 
3.1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. Ks User mart tne Evakjausrvs & Snsoaczcns Deadline re?ere*v^*i in Sectcn 
24{c)*2uyef shall: ;a) complete slf Evaiuaiicn* & inspectors; and {b> aeaermine if i re Evaluations & inspections are 
acceptable to Buyer. 
3 J> Right to Cancel or Object !f Buyer determines that the Evaluations & nspecaens are unacceptable. Buyer nay, 
no !ater thart the Evaluations & Inspections Cesdfce, eethe-:. (a) cancai this Ccntrac: &y providing wntten nebee to Setier. 
whereupon the Earnest Money Decosfc snail be released tc Buyer, or (b) provice Seller with wrfcsn notice of cbjecisrs. 
6 3 Failure to Respond. If by the esp'rason cf tne Evs.ua(.tcna & tnspecticns Desdtaa, 8uyer dc.e± i ict (a) cancel this 
Contract as provided in Secticr 8^2: or (b) deliver a wr.tten cftscScr. to Seller regarding the Evaica&ons & Irioecscns. u*.e 
Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer. 
6 4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objection* *c Seiier, Buyer and Setter shall have seven calendar davs 
after Setter4* reedpt of Buyer's oisechons (trie "Response PerkxT; !n wntgSjc "agree in w t m g uocn the manner cf resohr.ng 
Buyer's obr^cSons. Sefler may, but 3rtcil not be required to, ^ esdve Buye^s^3h|ecdcns. If Bi^er and Seder have not screed 
to writing Upon the manner of rest^v^Biryer'Sotgections. 3-jyermsy caiiC^: this Chirac! by provicing r.titten nobce tn S^ler 
no teter than thrae calendar ciays after expiration cf the P.esponba Pa-8co: jvrs-5i:pcn tna Sacrist Money Deposi shall be 
released fc> Euyer. If this Contract m net canceled by Buyer ur^e: 'h** SCCLO-;. 5. ^, Severs oDjeeoons shaS be deemed wavecf 
by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those fiems warranted in Seeder. 10. 
9. ADOmONAL TERMS. Trm^ [ J ARE V ARE NOT addenda to ih& Contract coniain:ng accRionai tenrs. !f there are. 
he terms of ifse fdfowing addenda are irtcorporsted into this CcrtBct by t^:s refercrcc: [ ] Addendum No. ' 
J Survey Addendum [ ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHAAfA Loan Addendum £ 1 Assumption Addendum 
J Laad-Gased Paint AAJendum (in some transactions this addendum 13 required by taw\ 
1 Other (specify) " 
O. SEULER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS. 
10,1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Setter nss tea Me to tne = ropert/ and wi) cenvev gcoo and marketable 
3e tc Buyer at Casing by general warrant/ deed, unless the sale is being .-rsae pgreuant ts a re^ estate contract vwhicn 
^ovides for tite to pass at a later sate. In that case, title will ce conveyee !:: acccrd3r.ee with the prevrsiens of snat contrac 
uyer agrees, howverver. to accepttftle to the Property subject to the foile w.nc matter* cf :eco! z: essemspts. deed restnetbrs 
ZZ&s {HTeaning ccvensnts. ccnd:t«cns and restn^cris). zr£ -cris-of-v.a/ ?.-.- sL-b;»c: :c the c^ r t ^ t * D* the (>rnrVr:--^ 
r f 
s t n i t f aJSa^C/ - D a t e 7 2 y ^ Bayer's Inrfab ^ ^ ^ p a t e &/^7'<*i ge 3 of 6 panes Seller* 
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>r Title Insurance as 
ffeofcr^-the Property 
ssoaauon dues, utilities, and other s e r v e r prcvidea 
« i - n e d DV Buyer und~ Section 2.1.C). Seller will csi<se 10 be paid cff by Closing a»i mortgages, rust deeds judgmenis. 
Manse ' sSen* , tax tens and warrant. Seter *^> ca J S * » be paw ^nrer.t by dosing a!! assessments and humetxvriers 
association dues. 
1C.2 Condit ion of Property. Seder warrants thai >^ e Psc-perty *-;i be .:!.KX>Q^wfr^cjrclDc.-. ON THE OATE SELLER 
>eUV3RS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO B U Y « : 
(a) the Prcoeny snail be crcom-dean and *ree & cebns a--.d c a r i n a c ^ n ^ n c s . Any Sei.er or lenari mo^ng-related 
damage to the Property shall be ropar^d at Seters expense; 
(b) the nesting, cooing elected, plumbing and sDrinider systems and fixtures, and the a?p.>r.nce* ard fireplaces wi!l 
bo in working order and fit fcr tneir intended purposes: 
(c) the rocf and foundation s te l be free of iesxs knovvr. to Setter. 
(d) any private w«8 or sepfic tank servErs the Property 3**s» rave ^ p i ^ x i e permits and snail be 75 *.-crkinc order sne 
fit for its intended punposa; snd .. 
(e) the Property and improvements, i-^ciudir-s :n<s iandscapirc, *•$ - e in ZPS ST.TS jtrjeca* ccr.c\zzrt as .-.-ey wars on the 
date of Acceptance. 
t 1 . WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before SertJeTient. *uyer may. iipcn reasenstte notice and a%. a reasonable time, 
scndiict a ^jvatio-Jhrougrf inspecben of the P-operty to determine onry th2t the Property is ~as represented," meaning tnstthe 
items referenced in Sections 1 . : , 8.4 ana 10.2 ftr.a terns") are respectively present, rer^ired/chaarigec es agreed, and in the 
a/arranted condftiorv. tf the tetms are net 33 represerrteo. Seller *m . D.TOT to Statement, replace, ccrrec: cr repair the ixms 
cr. with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if appacaole). escrow 2n amount at Sedscmsni xo arcvid* *?r (he same. The failure 
tc 'conduct a walk-through inspection, or tc claim that an iter; is nci =s r^presenf^d. shaii rot consu-ute a vwaivef by Buyer of 
the right to receive, on the cate of possession, the items as 'epreserttetf 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seler agrees that from the date of Acceptance unm the dale cf Closing none of 
the foflcwlng shall occur wShcut the prior written consent of Buyer: {£} nc changes in any existing Jesses shafl be made; (b J 
no new leases sr&H be anterao into: (c) no SJbstsntial attars^ens cr improvement to the Property siiaii be made or 
undettaken; end (d) no further financial encumbrancer to the Property Shan Se made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. rfBuyerGrSe!lertsacorporaticn.par:::a.^hi^trJ5: esisi-. Smited itabsTy ccmcany. orcthef 
enfity. the person executing this Contract on rts oehaif wsrrar,:s l i s zf hei a^rncnr/ :o z~ so and x b-r.d fit-yer and Sefler. 
14- COSiPLETE CONTRACT, Tnis Contrac: tocetr.er wit?-i its addenda, any attacned exhibits anc Seller Disdo&u-'iS 
constitutBs the entire Contract be*areen the part»« and supersedes and reciaces any sne all phcr negotstions. 
reprettintabons. warranties, understandings cr miL«ach» between the parties. This Contract cenr.a :e charged except cv 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DfSPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any disc Jkz. 4i:scyg p-jor to cr f^re? Closing relafed cc t t e Contract 
[ ] SHALL p<l WAY (upon mutuai agreement of the parties} ftrsi oo SL^ -n^c ^ mediajcr- If She cartes agree tc meciaiicn, 
the dispute shaU be s^mft ted to mediation through a mexfianon pro*/tder r:t;rus/ry agreed uccr. bv ne parties. Eac± carry 
agrees to bear its own costs of roetfaSor.. if mactason feifcs, rhe otner p.-ccec^res snd refrteciies avai«3b»e under ihis Contract 
snail apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shafl j rcnjta any -sfty from seeicing efrrrfgency eouitabie r^.&f poncing rnediaiion. 
16. DEFAULT, fi Buyer defeufcs. Sefler r^ay elact erther to retain the Earrwis; Money Deceit as rtqufcatad darrages. or tc 
return it and sue Buyer t3 specifcafly enferc^ this Contract c pursi.e cfoer -err.-ecses aveJabSa a! iaw. tl Sc5er dafauits, in 
addition to raTwi-m of !he Earnest Money Cescsit Buyer, msv etect eimer tc zuctx tor: Setie- a smn equa to ^ e Earnest 
Money Deposit as iwuicated {^rnaces. or may sue SeUer to SLeof C3^y err.-rcs? ?r.is Corrtraa c< puTsiie ct^er remedies 
ava2able at iav/_ !f Buyer feifecis to accept ;iqx>:ic!ad damages. Seiier agrees :c pay £e -l^iiKsated r'^rrege? to Buyer upon 
demand. !t is agreed that denial cf a Losr. App-icatcn made by tr^ Buyer is r.z i a default 2rvi is coverrteo'py Seccon 2 3{ b 1 
17. ATTORNEY F H S AND COSTS. \n the aven: cf litgatior; or blrc'iac sm;ri^t»cT o enforce- this COTTSCL he pres-aihn^ 
party shall be eri t ted to costs and reascr-aSis sttcmey fees. However, hux -ay fees ^ja«! ro ! oe awvarceo rcr p^nuiipa^cr. 
•n mediation under Section 15. 
O -J> 
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18 NOTICES Except as prwided ir- Secrai 23. a.! notices requires under tn»s Contract mus; oe: (aj «r writing, (b) signed 
by "the party giviog notice: and (c) received by the otter parry or me cthe- psrtys agem no later tear. tht applicable ctele 
referenced irt this Cornrsct 
19. ABROGATION, Except forihe p-X^sicr* n: Sections iC 1 ; 3.2 15 r.?:d " ^  and ^ xpreis warranties made »n tr.is Contract 
the provisions of !his Contract snaJ nc* spciy after CJc2»n%;. 
20 RISK OF LOSS. All nsH of teas to the Property, incicctng onyskai carnage or cestrucacn »o the Property or its 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and VSB: =*nd loss causec by a taking m err*ner.:cortiaint shall be bem* 
by Sailer until the transaction is olosecL 
21 TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Tirre s^ of tne esser.ee reoardinc the dates set "orth m this Contract. Extensions must be 
acresd to tn writing by a» partes. Ur.iess othe-'wise exdkrth'siatec :n sWi Contract: {a}£erasrrr.2r.ce under each Secton of 
trts Ccnlisd which referwxKS 2 date snai: absduae*/ be renuirea by 5 CG P.U iVourlain i >m* on the sirred slate: and (b) the 
term "dsvsr $nafl rnasr. catendsr daysanc: shall be cx,n;eG beginmr; c~» the da-/ fcftowing the s*er*t wrucr. tnegers the t>m«rg 
requirement (i.2., Accepfcanca, racacol of tne Selter Disclosures. a!c.:. Per?cr7T!3r.ce daces and Sfres referenced herem shall 
net be bincing upon title ccrnoanies! lenders, appraisers and 3\h*xs not pzrtes, ID ths Cor^rac^ except as otnerwise agreed 
to in wnbng by such non-party. 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. FscsLTtte r^ax) transmission of a signed ccpy of ;hts Contract, any 
acdenza ana ^cunteroffers, and :ha renarsrr^sic-'- ct any >$rec fax s^aii be the same as deliver? of ar cnoinal. This 
Contract and any sddeflda arid counteroffers insy be ejsesfiea.- count*, parts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance * occurs when Sei ~r cr Suyer. respc nci~c to an otter or c^rtf eroner of trie other, ia> signs 
$\e offer or counteroffer where noted 50 indcare accepterce; ana (b) communicates tc trie ctner psrty cr to the ctner party's 
agent that the offer or counteroffer has been sigred as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and 5e*er a$:ze thai Ihe following ceadf »nes <naii apply x this Contract 
(a) Application Deadline 3 »^a& 1 . X O O ^
 (5a te) 
(b> Seller Disclosure Deadline ^» A W " « » * * t " * ~ Q ^ \ (Date) 
(c) EyaluatktfK^lxispecfionsDeadUne ^ ^ y t * » ^ 4 X . Q i > ^ ( p ^ 
(d) SattkmMtit Deadline v J C < T
 u ^ M ^ X o O ^ (patel 
25. OFFER AND TlliE FOR ACCEPTANCE, ouyef offers to puicnas^»ha Pi jpecy c r ^ e abrwe terns anc cC"x2»*Jons. If 
Seller does not accept thb offer b>: M k ^ ^ I ] AM T^JsPM Mountain Tifne po' ^ N^M^-yGase^ tn s effar n^ai? lapst' 
^ d the Brokerage sha« nstum »ie Earnest Money Deposit to Biryer 
Euy/rsSisraO-rs) / ,0(ier Da-el . g j f r g j l ^ b m f f i ' ' , V J Jo*!cm 
The ia»r »:• ^t». ^bc^» Cffw Oace*. sJtaii !> j c t i r i a lo as r!te "Of^rf =_r»'fc«iyvis Caie' 
7 y Z) ^/AA(L^\ M EUJncLtL 3^/to ^/,
 3 S O Q w ^ ^ ^ t ^ g^STd &Oi &7b Z*. 
buyers'Names} (PLEASE PRINT] ~F~~~ (Nocca APJC«S5 ^Prwiej 
3e 5 of 6 pages Seder's in ind ic^y^V Oatc^Zj^ ^ / Buyers In^bals C ^ ^ Da l e S / ? 7 K>f 
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ACCEPTANCS«OUNTEROfFe«iREJECTION 
HECK ONE: 
a ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts ihe foregoing offer on the terms and coidttons specified 
**• above. 
i COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance Ihe terms of Buyer's clfer subjed to the exceptions or 
J c o ^ _ _ „ ^^ j f ie , , ^ k # 0 ^ ADDENDUM NO. 
* / X H * « < 
rSJgraUjre) ' (hata*) (Tknej (Seiert SignaSre) . (Dale) (Xwnt) 
i ters' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) ( N o * * Address) (Phone) 
) REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. 
iter's Signature) (Date) ( T i m e ) ( S e H e r * s Signature) (Date) (Time) 
t M < < M I M » » » 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
ale law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (FU in applicable 
ctJonbeJcw.) 
ladatowtedgereceirtofafaal^ 
jp^ert Signature) • ( D a l e ) (Buyer's Signature) ' J (Date) 
Htefs Signature) (gfa») ' (Setters Signature) " "(BSe) 
I persooaly caused a Bnal copy of the fcxego^ Contra ] faxed [ Irnavfteri r ihand 
i v t r e d o n _ (Date), postage prepaid, tolhef ] Seller [ ] Buyer. 
Sent/DeOvered by (specify)
 m 
^ r r ^ , , v t ^ t ^ l « « C T 3 0 f 1 9 9 9 IT REPLACES AW SUPB*SQ>eS ALL PREVIOUSI Y SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSIV APPROVED VERSIONS (JMWSTOW. 
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ADDENDUM J 
RESIDENTIAL LEASE WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE 
Ws^m^m^^^^{om.^ wot OflobsT. «_ZCJ&-*M*m*m-X> 0«*.A t,_C3„regr,,7 A. 
g _ > — « • L ; rW^- foer tmarter catted Lessor and T y P * M^r^s *) r - U M j f , woeas&gns. r*reirarto a»rt Lessee. The Lessor, for and » 
consideration ol the sum 01 ? H O O P - * ° o^Uars in naici paio h ••*? Les:c?. see** c? wmch * heiet'y aduwwledced. hereby leases to the Lessee b* 
-heirs or ascites. thepremises situated .nihiOtyof . - J & r ^ l t t - - - -..Cwi'Hyel O . i ^ h f r f r n f c . 
s u t t 0 l UJ-k._.... wga^^ i^eae .l^:..^.ff.>,M <-• rV«sl Ar^l...jdl^--'-ptiunJ 
l<r\Q ^ f s L2J2_sh-^ s.. w^ r JL^ . ...fro */**<-*'-* ?! -v- ^u~sja „ < a r ^ _ ..o..-l Eu.leU<p 
iitihelegtf descnpraaismft wdoO«l 3t the time c! weet-non. it may be JtecwU » wd incorporated he/em .^-fvferc. * (Slwet afldr-ss- - - ^ 4 ^ W ' ^ M _ ^ L 
Me,0Vcx U T ft40S3 i aw consist tf J> *"«**£ ^ U " l n . f « * * t \ i ? 0 f t the wowing TEHMS and CONDITIONS 
>. PERSONAL PROPERTY: SahJ lease stiai! -jidudt the h*owi:!fi person* ^ ropifty: - - 2 * ^ . b ^ l l - i - J ? . r ^ i H - - ^ ^ n ' - -Sfef-tiSfSL, ! ^ ^ L 
f,r A C ^ / fie>7^r- . 
2. 7£RII:Thc!e.^r:eniof3rtfnco^meiK^an>_«_Auii/ J **. . V . ^ h l «-td«,rwnhibetofaperiodcM l i t ? r.-io!:m.;ibefeafter. 
3. RENT: Ren; shah* be S _ I & ^ * pe« month ps>at->e -n a>2s«;e. upiM 'J* .».«i wy o,' -JC* cale/iaa.' month to Lessor or his autiiorized agen' at the 
M t o * * a * t a » i ' H S W . Z±CO__£, k ^ e . . . W e . . . _ . L n L _ _ & J £ 4 & Q . 
or at such other places as may be designated by Lessen fcom time io times, in me event rer.i ui I;OI a*d *?;!hm live (5/ days after at/* d«te. Lessee agrees to pay a iafe crarge of s — Q 
plus interest at ^ % per a;num on tr* delmquen! jmoum. 
4. UTILmESrLess^shaJiQerKpoiKibte^^ uc~uv IiL^z 
which siiaK be paid by Lessor. 
5. USE: The premises 5ha£ be used as a res«o i^ta and iu> no otrur pu.Vi-.3Si'. *»!hoi; ••* piv;i witicr cy- •>..;.. rr.- • -ss^ 
6. HOUSE RULES: in me even: that Ihe premises are i p&rhori d< a befldtfg containing more tha* «if»^  'jmt. lessee ?5«es to athde by ^ ry ar.d sN house rwtes. whether procnu»g?!esJ 
before or alter the execution hereof, including, hut not hmitedlo. rules with f2spect lo noise, oeors, dispesai of nryji. peis. parking, ar-d use ol common i»eas. 
7. ASSiGNWENT AND SUBLETTING: U S S M m*y ai»9fl <hU aorttmtRt er wow IR> porlkm of me premises w/T^ w« prior wrtttpa conteot of the Lessor. 
8. MAINTENANCE. REPAIRS OR ALTERATIOWS: Lessee sfcafl rrainiain the preo>ite-5 in a dean and SDrmnry numier inchidsng aM eqotpment. apphances, lumitun and tumisti 
hgs tf*5tern and snail surrender the same sf lerminahon Hiiui. -.T JS cc»cd c^miiiior. ^ ? r^t:ved. .:c/iv;t! wsi.- .MVC f^ cV -;>.• opfei. I essee s^»l t* ;espoTs»hie tcr oamaijes caused by ws, 
negligence and lhatof ms famdy or mvftecs or guests. *>.IZM srw4;- ixc^^c .ntf maintain sir/ 5arrD;>noJru» a^ w-Td;.. z\u»*<-3b iawns sx? shruobf ry. and keep thu same cter ol rubbish anfl 
weeds i? such grounds are a part of the pfcmises and ire twciMUiy TG-' in* ,se t-? th4 Les^ c^ 
9. ENTRY AND INSPECTION: Lessee shaH permit Lessor or Lessoi £ ayentt io enter the prw^cs at rsEsonab'* y n « 3RD .'por. reasonable no«ct :w ttu; purpose o? inspecting rhe 
premises or for making necessary rt&irs 
10. POSSESSION: » Lessor is uw»e to Oelivtr possesskm cA tte i*»rmsft; a. the commenccr»>r»r.| he..eol. i c?.*or ssar rrot &• liable tor aj»y da.T«ge causw »neret)y nor snatf ttxs 
agfeement be vtvd or vofdab»e. out lessee shall nol be HaWa fw *v/ n-n» u.Ttl f;»vess«ort n ,le.Sv_T^ u l*f^tt may ur/.r.na^ tnis agreement n poj»se56JO?> ns not setrvrad vfttnin 
/-i=2 . days ol &e cummencememof frete.fti IfSieu? 
11. SECUftfTY: fne security deposit ol S L L . ^ s -.a! sec:-* Hf ?enufrr.ai:cf o.' rhl: i ^ i»;*'s oo«g«tions iierecr»d»fr Lessor KUy. but sh>li nci be ora ted to. 
apply all or portions of sssd deposit cm account of lassee :s obh^ncn-i r*e^ u«vier Ar»y oal»f.ce i?mvwng L-^I te»rn:najcii sh?M >.=: reuj^ed >o Lessee. 
12. OEPOSTTFUNDS: Any r^ tumabie 3eoosi!£ 3hal! be refunded wnr?>f, v,nttr. oay? iron uate possesi.«ori s tfehve;BiI ?5 lessor or nis A-jmorized Agent 
13. ATTORNEY FEES: The orevaifing party sroil be crm>tc2 to all cosis incurred in connection with am' fcgal sct^ on ^iHjg^l :>y either party to eaJcrce the lerms ncreof rr rrfaiing in 
hie demised premies. induding i-easonaols altern* ^  t*« 
14. NOTICES: Ai>y notice which either naiiy m*: w is .'L;J , JPI: »L
 V *»* *
,
'^ y « ; .^-» •#, o:a;;.r.^  tr c ^  ;*t p.».«;»L' vi.--hi'.-. «•-. it^-v oi io uv.sor a» t»t aooresses 5f>o»n toenw or * 
sucri other c^2C5ias may se designaied t^ r the paci.-t? *.ri.T r^ .c ^ \«.v«. 
15. HEIRS, ASSIGNS. SUCCESSORS: Trns :?w T r :»*j ^:..;r, >idi ?a:LL't - i ^ :.«:c . ..rj ^ : : f-: ??.:,r£. ri»e£:;fu.'i. -o.-n;nistraton. sjeccssors. a?A dssqnso'. ihr reipectrie 
parses hereto 
16. TIME: T»me is ol the essence of foil agreement. This of\u i.ha»: ,5'm*rrdtp if not3Ccefjieoco!GTi;_ l^l.l^z. J IS 7 , 0 0 ^ 
17. HOLDlNO OVER: Any holding ever afler cKj?:*-.n:r-t? cl !f* te/ n ->f th:s Iz*,*. wc^  tr.= :ci:^f -»•:? L*-.f:c: ihi»! yj jnu^.i.-ed 25 i: mcr.tn-ic*-mon;>. br-jtw; m acccrdanceivrth rhe 
lerms hereol. as applicable. 
1 e. DEFAULT; .1 Lessee sholl laH ta pay .'tfv: ^Y^^ OL. er jKflcrm *.;y i<;.Ti l;er««ol Mv :•* •.*.-. 'rH :»'• £r. *,; {?a, > • vr..'\sr. r.^ Dce ui soon eefi»»rt ^wen »n ^  ma»»n*r required oy la*. 
the Lessor, at n« option, may ierminateat! rightsc-L^-vtc- i^'tyr.uv-. ^>:i ts^i-v *::»-4r. .>irf? «..TC. S-*r. m -K% dcMulr i : ! zu*r. fABkbrts u/ v?.u?es ?hc property, whilemdetatrti 
ot the payment of rtne. Lessor may consjoer any pjepw y^ -n o:.« ?he premscs to bf a&ar^ G,;-.^  and ,7 ay d^oib i.l toe w.r.f ,r in>r ^ ^ J U ^ ^ J &y j * * to rhe m* me Lessor 
reasonably bafieves thai such abandonad prQperr>' uss («.o *Mt u may be crs^fued 
| E ) ( H I B r T ^ 1 
OPTION: Lessee snaJi have the option to purchase ins leased premises descilbed herein upon the tafcntfng TERMS £rt CONDITIONS. 
a.) The total purchase price shall te 1 - 2LQ 5^ QSJL^Z ( T^Ttf ^<"\&<& £i^JJ^£^i^.d Dollars) 
b.) The purchase price sfiatt be pari as toitews. A H c * i r\ 
L ENCUMBRANCES:uessee9baJItaketitle to thepropertysubnetto" iJNeilf state1amr.xyri 2« i*••*>CCc-eiuits. cniulithii.v rest/idions. rasarvation-j. rijnts. rightso?wav 
d taieminrs of record, If any. which do not materially arftocf the viiae or tniortce-J itsa o! me pro jerry 
I. EXAMINATION OF TITLE: fifteen (IS) day* from dale oi fcxerirje of t??rs .pti»!» ctt aiu^U - e icssss tc *i.miiire to« tiUr. Ut lb© f:0^ty and is te-purt in vntinp any valid 
>jectiona thereto. Any e*ceyoons 10 the tine which would ot dttdosad by examination of the i«rrcas f fcj-l r* O I *T*C to have bean accepted :<nteij» leported »*• «vritino *Hfcin said 15 
lys. U Lessee ooiects to any exceptions to the title. Lessor shall use all dje diii-jnnce to ?ei»M)ve sum a>c&0iicns a* l a o*n ttvpense wiitim 60 oiya litereaJiif But w such exception 
moot be removed within the 60 days allowed, alt rqhu and oblation* lAieunaar may. at me dtoOtGA -•• tie i aisto. ur rnnalp ami end. untos* aa efcett to purtnase me property *ubfBd 
) such exceptions. 
a. EVIDENCE OF TITLE: lessor Shalt provide srtmon \A Tsto in thf ton* o! a cutir.v ut itt» insu?i«Kji ai Us,sui * t^enso 
13. BILL OF SALE: Ths personal pro^ r^ty jdfcnt'fi*: in paugraph ! iha?J 5fc conveyed :•? Pt'f of '\k» 
24. CLOSING: Closing snail be within _ . __£=! days Irom exa^se of n* option sKim i-varis* fwwrttj by ctho. teirr s o! th*s ao*eem**i!. 
25» PRORATIONS: Tax and insurance escrow account, if &<v tj U if&isifjfed inUc! to Lessor with uo prorjbon*. UVtrtsi and other expense* ot toe prcpetty to te prorated as of the 
date ot dosing. Unpaid reaJ estate taxes, security deposits, advance rentals or considerations ir. vowing future tease cedfte sfcaJ! be ct edited to I essee 
2ft* EXPIRATION OF OPTION: This option nay be exorcised at any t;rrjr prior to tt4 «(•:> JUCH at'nsdnichf -*/'»•></ / " t * " _ „ / £ ° j j ? _ 
Upon eviration, Leseoi snail be released from alt oWroabon* bwttmttd.' -vd a4 ot L»*=t«. i fiii-.ii nar*unati. !&»*i or equitable. sha» r ftase 
27. EXERCISE OF OPTION: The option siuC Do exs/usar? cy n»a;ttr:o o» ijelutii-1{ wnttcn liotu* IO th« • issw pi:?r ;o the expirai;;* at tnis apt»o(s Ncrct it mailed shall be by 
certified mail, postiye prepaid, to the Lessor at the address sstfoitn btftcw. H.X! stall be vHeif.-u;' •. •.• ;^ vt> u»»i p**r, ipon t<,f duv ^ .uwn on me postman of the envtkipe in vrhich IUC^ 
notice is mailed. In the event the option is exercised *~ >> percent Kom the rem pa«ii namu.idsr poor *i *t\$ exercise of the optwn shall be i/aditec upon the purchase pnot 
28c fSQHT TO SELL: Lessor warrants to Lessee that lessor is the tea?* owner uf \M leased prc;?i»S(5 vati has Uw w^a! tight to sell leased premises under the tern\s and conditions of 
this agreement. 
IN WiTKCSS WHEREOT, the parties hereto hove erecutod this a^wrvn* the riay aird year fu i i abov& wit'en. 
/^ P. eJcCiJ^ 
ItSSOK 
ItSSOrt 
^ " E S 5 ' " ' ~ AUDftSs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Debbie Reed, am employed by the office of ALLRED & 
McCLELLAN, P. C , attorneys for Defendants herein, and hereby 
certify that I served two copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-
APPELLANTS on counsel for Plaintiffs by placing true and correct 
copies thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
ALVIN R LUNDGREN 
ALVIN R LUNDGREN L.C. 
5105 W OLD HWY STE 200 
MTN GREEN UT 84050 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Rooogvelt, Utah, on the Q/ / 
day of November, 2006. 
Debbie Reed 
